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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

A monthly Magazine to maintain the cause of
TRUTH, FREEDOM, and COMPREHENSIVENESS
in the Anglican Communion.

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, B.D.

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THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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OUR TWELFTH YEAR

By THE EDITOR

With this number the *Modern Churchman* enters on its twelfth year. A strong sense of need brought us into existence, and a growing sense of usefulness has kept us alive through years which have been as full of difficulty as they have been full of hope. When the *Modern Churchman* was first founded it was not easy to get serious attention or patient hearing in Church circles for those educational and ecclesiastical ideals for which we have tried consistently to stand. Since then the situation has improved greatly. We do not claim for one moment that this is entirely due, nor even primarily due, to the activities of English Modernists. Rather, we may say, those forces which brought English Modernism into existence have with the passage of the years become more evident and more influential in our Church life. What is remarkable about English Modernism to-day is not the rapid growth of its organization, but the wide dissemination of its spirit. The majority of the younger educated clergy to-day are Modernist, although not necessarily members of the Churchmen's Union, and so long as the right of Modernism to exist be acknowledged, and provided there be no active persecution of its adherents, they are not likely to feel any obligation to become avowed members of this school and open supporters of its policy. Nothing, however, would do more to increase the organized strength of Modernism than a widespread and influential effort to suppress it. Such an effort would be bound to fail, and

the wiser among our Traditionalist opponents, who are aware that public opinion would never support such a policy, are altogether against initiating it.

. . . .

But if Modernism has already reached the stage when it has become a *religio licita*, we may hope that long before the *Modern Churchman* has doubled the span of its existence Modernism will not only be tolerated, but will even be viewed with gratitude in ordinary Church circles as that which has revived and rejuvenated a decadent Church. For undoubtedly as Modernism steadily and irresistibly advances English Traditionalists will come to see that Modernism is the truest ally of all that they value most in the Christian religion. With that advance the antagonism between Traditionalist Anglo-Catholics and Traditionalist Evangelicals will disappear, as will also the differences between the Established Church and the Free Churches. For Modernism is a veritable spirit of reconciliation, as it is also a spirit of liberation; a spirit of comprehensiveness as well as a spirit of progress; and the future we believe to be as certainly with it as it is with the Spirit of Christ.

There are to-day only two alternatives open to the English Church. These are Romanism and Modernism. Although a number of Anglicans do not see this, our Jesuit opponents, whose sagacity is always deserving of respectful attention, see it very clearly. It is this which accounts for the bitterest attacks upon English Modernism coming not from Anglican, but from Romanist, opponents. If the English Church becomes Modernist, all hopes of Roman ascendency are crushed. The English Church is so situated that it cannot sit still. It can decide the direction of movement, that is all. Romanism means moving backward, Modernism means moving forward. Churchmen whose ideals are Catholic, but not Roman, would do well to realize this. Modernism, if they will but examine it, they will find to be the best friend to Catholicism. For Modernism is truly comprehensive in its spirit; it is social, not individualistic, in its conception of Christianity; it is utterly opposed to schism and sectarianism; it believes in salvation within the Church and in fellowship with one's fellow-

Christians; it believes in the great historic body of Christ and regards separation from it with abhorrence. Modernism has no desire to see the Church surrender its historic ministry, its historic rites, its historic formularies. Modernism values the past, but it also values the present and the future. It believes in evolution under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. It believes that a living Church must be creative as well as conservative: that it must be capable of bringing new ministries, new rites, new formularies into existence as they are needed. Whilst the Modernist values the past, he cannot regard the past as the master and measure of the future. But the point we are particularly anxious that our Catholic critics should grasp is that there is nothing irreconcilable in Modernism and Catholicism provided that Catholicism be neither narrow nor rigid. If it be narrow and rigid it is not really Catholicism, but antiquarian Christianity, for Catholicism is something which is essentially comprehensive, progressive, flexible, capable of winning for Christ, and baptizing into Christ, much which the non-Catholic Spirit would regard as essentially anti-Christian. That is one of the lessons of Church History, but Church History as read not through Protestant spectacles nor through Romanist spectacles. The spirit of Modernism if it be viewed in this way will be seen to be the spirit of vital, energetic, proselytizing Catholicism, striving to baptize modern knowledge, and modern ideals, and modern methods, into Christ.

In another of its aspects the spirit of Modernism will be seen to be the spirit of Protestantism—not the spirit of individualism and sectarianism, not the spirit of Puritanism and Bibliolatry, but the spirit which believes in truth and freedom and the right of the individual to enjoy free and full communion with God without dependence upon rites and ministries. Whilst Modernism acknowledges the value of sacramental worship for some Christians, it realizes equally the value of the Quaker type of worship for others, and it looks forward to, and works for, a Christian Church great enough to admit both types and with an infinite number of gradations between them.

An objection constantly urged against Modernism is that it is *intellectualist*. This is really not the case. Some Modernists are *rationalist*: some are *mystical*: but all

Modernists would acknowledge that it is only the pure in heart who see God, and only those who have the love of God in their hearts who really come to know God. What the Modernist objects to is the insistence upon holding certain traditional views of Scripture, of the Church, of the ministry, and of various ecclesiastical dogmas, which he believes modern research has shown to be false, as needful to a good Christian life. He regards these discredited views as detrimental, and urges that if not definitely discarded, at least they should not be insisted on. But this is not religious *intellectualism*, which means to make salvation depend primarily upon right-thinking. Much as the Modernist values right-thinking, he values right-willing, right-doing, right-feeling more highly, and objects to the intellectualist attitude of the Traditionalist, who asserts unless you '*think* thus of the Trinity' or *think* thus of some other Church dogma, you cannot be saved.

Here it may not be amiss to deal with another objection urged against Modernism, which is based upon a complete misconception. We hear it said repeatedly, 'Modernism is negative'; 'Modernism is only interested in denial'; 'Modernism stands for a reduced Christianity.' Now, Modernism is not primarily concerned with conclusions. Modernism stands for an attitude of mind—the open mind: it also stands for modern methods of study: it also declares with regard to certain historical, critical, scientific questions which the Church has dealt with in creeds and formularies, that these matters must be determined finally by historians, critics, and scientists, and that the Church must in the end accept their verdict. But there is no denial of anything Christian here: un-Christian denial is refusal to accept the truth, not refusal to believe a fiction. Furthermore, this Modernist attitude does not entail 'a reduced Christianity.' The type of mind which urges that objection has got obsessed by the notion that the Christian religion or the Christian Faith consists of a number of propositions—perhaps as many as Luther nailed to the door of the Schloss-Kirche at Wittenberg—which ought to be believed. But Christianity is not a matter of propositions. Christianity is faith in a Person; the possession of a Spirit: the striving after the realization of a moral ideal. You may reduce the number of the propositions greatly,

but it does not follow that you reduce your Christianity thereby. You can believe much without believing many things; just as you can do much without doing many things. In fact the number may be in inverse ratio to the quantity. This charge about a reduced Christianity is the survival of a scholastic view of Christianity, which is really in opposition to a moral and spiritual conception of it. If you believe that God is Love, and Light, and Truth: if you believe that in Jesus Christ you have the unveiling of the Divine Nature *sub specie humanitatis;* if you believe in an ever-present Spirit of Truth and Love with which you may hold communion, it will not follow that your Christianity will be more reduced than if you hold all the propositions of the Council of Trent, or of the Westminster Confession, or of the Thirty-nine Articles. Christ's summary of Christian Duty was much shorter than the Law and the Prophets of the Old Testament, but it cannot be said on that account to be 'reduced.'

IN MEMORIAM

We regret to record the loss which our cause has sustained by the recent death of two of its London supporters. The Rev. William Alban Cunningham Craig, M.A., Vicar of St. Sepulchre's, Holborn Viaduct, E.C., died on March 25th in St. Bartholomew's Hospital, as the result of being knocked down by a motor vehicle. Mr. Craig, who occupied various posts in the Southwark Diocese before his college presented him to St. Sepulchre's in 1921, was a strong Liberal Evangelical and worked steadily for a better understanding and closer co-operation between Evangelicals and Liberals. He was a warm supporter of the Cheltenham Conference Movement and a valuable member of the Council of the Churchmen's Union, where his sound common sense and steady advocacy of an important aspect of the Liberal ideal will be missed very greatly by his fellow-members.

The Rev. Ronald Bayne, M.A., Rector of St. Edmund the King with St. Nicholas Acons, Lombard Street, died on March 27th. Most of his ministerial life was spent in the Metropolitan area. He was a scholarly clergyman, and edited Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity,* Bk. V. For some years he was a member of the Council. Like many Churchmen of his school, he regarded education and personal influence as the main factors in the promotion of Liberal Churchmanship, and had little belief in the more spectacular methods of organization and advertisement. The harvest he looked for was not to be garnered by the strident voice and pushing methods, but was that of the quiet eye and gentle ways.

SOME PLAIN WORDS TO BISHOP GORE

By the Very Rev. H. RASHDALL, D.D., D.Litt., D.C.L., LL.D., F.B.A., Dean of Carlisle.

II. *Athanasius and Bishop Gore.*

BISHOP Gore has accused Modernists—myself and others—of not believing in the Divinity of Christ (so far as I can discover), because some of us do not believe two things:

(1) That there existed before the birth of Christ a Son or Word of God who was 'personally' distinct from God the Father, and (2) that there was between this Word and the historical Jesus a complete 'personal identity.'

These seem to be the grounds upon which the Bishop pronounces that I cannot believe (in spite of my assertion that I do believe) in the Divinity of Christ or in the particular expression of that doctrine which is contained in the Nicene Creed.

Now I would observe, in the first place, that the Nicene Creed says nothing whatever about 'personality,' whether in its technical theological sense, or in its ordinary modern sense. Still less is anything said about 'personal identity.' The idea belongs to Bishop Gore's interpretation of the Creed—not to the Creed itself; and people ought not to be accused of not believing either the doctrine of Christ's Divinity or the Nicene definition of it because they do not accept Bishop Gore's private interpretation of its language. And, secondly, I would point out that Bishop Gore nowhere—either in his two Birmingham pronouncements or, so far as I am aware, elsewhere in his writings—defines the sense in which he uses the word 'personality.' He leaves us to assume that he uses it in the modern sense of the term—in exactly the same sense in which it is commonly said that I am one person and Bishop Gore another person. 'The Personality of Him who appeared on earth, Jesus Christ, did not begin with his human birth, but was the Personality of an eternal Person, the Eternal Son of God.' If Personality is not to be understood in the modern sense, there is not even a plausible ground for his saying, 'I feel sure that for Dr. Rashdall the Person of Jesus began to exist when He was born of human parentage.' It is true that, even when

we accept this identification of the theological with the modern sense of the term, vast questions might be raised as to the real meaning and interpretation of human personality. These questions Bishop Gore has not discussed either in his recent pronouncements or (so far as I am aware) in his previous writings. To some extent they should be discussed in any work which pretends to give anything like a philosophical account of the doctrine of Christ's Divinity. But I am not now writing such a treatise, and I am content to assume that we know what we mean when we apply the term 'person' to an individual human being: and this is the sense in which, so far as appears, Bishop Gore insists upon our treating Jesus Christ as, before the Incarnation no less than after it, a Person distinct from the Person of the Father, and as the same Person with the historical Jesus of Nazareth. Now I propose to ask whether this is the true meaning, or the only possible meaning, of the Nicene Creed. And as a means to answering this question I think it will be useful to examine what was the belief of Athanasius on the subject, to compare what he believed with what Bishop Gore apparently believes, and to ask whether the two beliefs can be identified.

Bishop Gore and other champions of Traditionalism are fond of talking about the 'mind' of the Nicene Council, and of assuming that the clergy of the Church of England at the present day are bound to accept the doctrines of that famous Assembly in the sense in which the Fathers of Nicaea held them. There is, as it seems to me, a certain absurdity in asking what was the 'mind' of 318 persons. Anyone with a little experience of the ways of ecclesiastical or political assemblies knows very well that the formulae which they agree upon frequently fail to represent the opinions of the majority who vote for them, or even of the majority of that majority, and that, in so far as they are really accepted, it is only because they are understood in a variety of senses. And in the particular case of the Nicene Council, there is a peculiar absurdity in talking about its 'mind.' The Creed was from the first accepted by a large part of the Assembly as a compromise, and as soon as the Council broke up, its members immediately fell asunder into groups and parties which interpreted the decisions in different ways, and some of which wanted to go back upon those decisions just

on the ground that they did not represent what they considered to be the true mind of the Assembly. Moreover, even if we could ascertain the mind of the Nicaean Fathers, I should contend that clergymen of our Church, or of any Church which includes the Creed in its Confession of Faith, are not in any way bound to accept their formulae in the sense which they put upon them. They are not bound by the decisions of that or any other General Council except in so far as they are embodied in the Creeds or other formulae of the Church to which they give their assent: and whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the extent of the latitude which may be allowed to the clergy in interpreting them, there is not the least pretence for saying that they must necessarily be accepted in the sense which from external evidence we may suppose that the majority of the Council intended. Least of all are we bound to agree with the personal opinions of Athanasius. But, subject to these reserves, Athanasius may, I think, reasonably be accepted as representing, so far as any individual can do, the 'mind' of the Nicene Council. And it will be interesting to enquire how far Bishop Gore's interpretation of the Creed agrees with his, since that may help to throw some light upon two other questions, *i.e.* (1) whether Bishop Gore has any right to impose his private interpretation upon others, and (2) how far that interpretation is reasonable in itself.

Athanasius on the pre-existence of the Word.

In the first place, I will ask what sort of pre-existence the Logos possessed according to Bishop Gore and according to Athanasius. The Bishop apparently believes that the Word of God was from all eternity a distinct Person from God the Father in the ordinary modern sense of 'personality.' And he would, I presume, attribute this view to Athanasius and the Council. Now here I believe that he is distinctly wrong. I do not myself deny that the Logos was a distinct Person of the Holy Trinity in the technical and theological sense of that term: nor would I deny that Athanasius held the same belief, so far as one can express what he believed in the terms of a theology which was not then fully formulated. The Latin term 'Persona' is, of course, not used in the Nicene Creed at all, nor is either of the terms which have at different times

been accepted as its proper Greek equivalent—'Prosopon,' generally rejected as savouring too much of Sabellianism, or what afterwards became the orthodox term, 'Hypostasis.' This last term is indeed used in the Anathemas attached to the Creed, but in a quite different sense. It is treated as the equivalent of Ousia, and an anathema is hurled against those who say that the Son is of a different 'Ousia or Hypostasis' from the Father. The original meaning of these two terms was practically the same: and the theological meaning for the Council and for Athanasius in the time of the Council was still the same. Those who talked about three Hypostases talked also about three Ousiai; to talk about three Hypostases or three Ousiai was at present a note of Arianism. Those who maintained that there was in the Godhead one Ousia maintained that there was one Hypostasis, and were accused by their enemies of Sabellianism for doing so. To this category Athanasius belonged. By a large part of the Christian world Athanasius was for a long period habitually regarded as a Sabellian, along with Marcellus of Ancyra, with whom Athanasius eventually disagreed, but whom he would never treat as a heretic. This fact must always be borne in mind when we endeavour to interpret the language of Athanasius.

Now undoubtedly Athanasius was not really a Sabellian. He quite distinctly asserted that the Father was not the Son, and the distinction which he recognized between Father and Son was an eternal distinction, not (as with the Sabellians) one that could be put off and on. But it must not be assumed that he would have recognized the distinction between them as equivalent to what we mean by a distinction of personalities. Even if we could assume that 'hypostasis' really meant what 'persona' meant for Latin theology, and that that meaning was equivalent to our modern term 'person,' we could not say that Athanasius treated the distinction between Father and Son as a distinction of 'Persons': for Athanasius treats Father and Son as having the same 'hypostasis.' But it may be suggested that, though he did not use the term, he habitually treated the difference between Father and Son as being of the kind which we should call a difference of personality. Now I do not deny that there are passages which point in this direction. When he is speaking of the Incarnate Son, he does this habitually;

and there are passages in which he applies to the distinction between Father and Son, even before and apart from the Incarnation, language which could most naturally be held to express a difference of personality—especially when actually quoting passages of Scripture which he believed to refer to the relation between Father and Son. I do not pretend to make Athanasius wholly consistent or wholly intelligible. I do not believe it possible to express in intelligible modern language exactly how Athanasius understood the relation between God the Father and the Word. He was not much of a philosopher: his whole position rested up exegesis; and he was bound to believe equally passages in the Old Testament, irrelevant or wrongly interpreted passages in the New Testament, pieces of tradition or judgements of extra-canonical authorities which really represented a number of quite inconsistent views. To some extent he would no doubt have professed himself unable fully to reconcile these contradictions, or to present a clear and perfectly intelligible account of the relation between the Father and the pre-existent Son; but of this I am quite sure—that, so far as he had any intelligible theory of the matter, it was not Bishop Gore's theory, or that popular view of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity which, by failing to distinguish between the ancient and the modern sense of 'Person,' Bishop Gore apparently defends.

The Arians, be it remembered, regarded Christ as God, but as a different God from the Father—different and inferior. They believed in a Trinity, but they did not believe in an 'undivided' Trinity. The meaning of the Homo-ousion and of a clause in the original Nicene Creed which Athanasius regarded as more important than the 'Homo-ousion' ('from the Ousia of the Father'), was precisely this—that there were not two divine Minds or three, but one. Whatever for him was the nature of the distinction between Father and Son, it was not a distinction between the one eternal God and another inferior, created God or demi-god, but a distinction within the Being of the One and Only God—and an eternal distinction. The Logos did not owe His existence to any act of the Father's will, any 'begetting' in time: the Logos was an element in His eternal Being. Never does Athanasius, in trying to explain or illustrate this distinction, use language which suggests

the notion of two distinct minds. He repudiates as forcibly as he can the Arian notion that the Three are One simply because of their complete harmony and agreement, which is very much the popular modern conception. He compares the relation between them to the relation between the fount and the stream, the luminous body and its rays—physical metaphors which may strike us as wholly inapplicable to mental existence, but which at all events suggest an identity much greater than any which can be supposed to exist between one mind and another mind. And it is not only negatively that Athanasius excludes personal difference. Whatever we may mean by 'personality' in the modern sense, we certainly mean the possession of knowledge. If the Father and the Son are two Persons in the modern sense, the Father must have knowledge, and the Son must have knowledge; there are two consciousnesses, each of which knows just as two human persons may know the same thing without forming one knowing mind. That which they know may be the same thing: but, psychologically speaking, there will be not one knowledge, but two knowledges, not one knowing mind, but two. The fact that one ceased to know would not affect the knowledge of the other. But this is not at all Athanasius's conception of the Father's relation to the Son. The Logos *is* the Wisdom of God: and there is no other Wisdom of God. The Father does not know except through the Logos. And this is no mere inference of mine. He expressly urges the point against the Arians. The Arians thought that the Son had a beginning in time, and was created by a deliberate act of the Father's will: the very idea of Sonship implied, they contended, a Being who existed before the Son existed, and was meaningless on any other assumption. But this, Athanasius argues, is impossible: if the Wisdom (*i.e.* Logos or Son) of God was created, then before that creation the Father could not have had even the thought of creating the Son or the world through Him, for the Father thinks only in or by means of the Son.[1] The Son, in fact, is His knowledge. The Son is God Himself as knowing and as creating, including in some sense the world which is created through Him, the Word. Athanasius takes

[1] Or. contra Arianos III, 61—63: de Synodis, 18, 52: de Sentent. Dionysii, 23.

quite seriously and literally the idea that the Son is the actua thinking of the Father: the Father without the Son could nc think: and therefore, of course, the Father could not exis without the Son. It would be scarcely possible to repudiat more formally Bishop Gore's apparent assumption that Fathe and Son are personally distinct in the modern sense. If the are personally distinct, then according to modern ideas (fc those who do not merge human personality in 'the Absolute they are 'outside' one another: and this is just what (accordin to Athanasius) they were not: 'the Word is not outside Him (*i.e.* the Father).[2] 'Father and Son are one and the sam Mind.'[3] Judged by the standard of Athanasius, Bishop Gor does not accept the Nicene Creed as it was understood by th Council, and he does understand it in a sense which that Cree was deliberately framed to exclude. I should contend that s far my own interpretation of Christ's Divinity is much neare 'the mind' of Athanasius and of the Council. With Athanasiu I interpret the Logos to mean the Wisdom or Thought of Go Sometimes Athanasius adopts a position which could only h justified by a more thorough-going Idealism than perhaps h would deliberately adopt. 'The Word of the Father is a things' (*Or. contra Arianos* III, 67). I suspect that, if this se tence had been found in a number of the *Modern Churchma* Bishop Gore would have quoted it to show that all 'Modernists are Pantheists. At times we are told also that the Son is th Will of the Father (ib. 63, *ad fin.*). God's Wisdom of course distinguishable from His Power and His Love, but that Wi dom is not a separate Mind or Person in the modern sens If God is one God, He must be one Mind. If Bishop Go would accept all this, I think he would find it hard to disti guish his view from mine. If not, he differs from Athanasiu All this is upon the assumption that 'Person' is used in th modern sense. It is true that in his Bampton Lectures (ed. pp. 133) Bishop Gore uses language which would lead one suppose that he would accept all that I have said above, but that case he should explain in what respect my view diffe from his. He declares, indeed, that 'the three Persons a not separable individuals' (p. 133), but he does not ev attempt to explain wherein a Person differs from an individu

[2] Or. contra Arian III, 62.
[3] Or. contra Arian. III, 5.

Personal Identity of Jesus with the pre-existing Logos.

Bishop Gore further holds it necessary to a true belief in the Divinity of Christ that we should believe the historical Jesus to be 'personally identical' (apparently in the modern sense) with the pre-existent Logos or Son of God. How far can such a belief be attributed to Athanasius? There is a difficulty in answering this question because, as we have seen, it is improbable that Athanasius regarded the Son as (in the modern sense) a different 'Person' from the Father. But we can have no difficulty in saying that whatever sort of distinctness from the Father the pre-existent Son possessed, that sort of distinctness was possessed also by the Incarnate, so far as the Mind (and not the body) of the Incarnate is concerned. Or rather we might say that practically the Incarnate possessed (as it would appear to us, though Athanasius might have repudiated it) greater distinctness: for most of the passages in which the distinctness of the Son from the Father is emphasized relate to the Word after the Incarnation rather than before it. But if we waive this difficulty, there is no doubt whatever that for Athanasius Jesus Christ was in the most literal sense the Word of God—as much God, and in the same sense God, as the Father.

But was his belief on this matter the same as Bishop Gore's? Most certainly it was not. For in all the earlier writings of Athanasius there is not the least trace of the belief that there was in Christ a human soul: and there surely we must recognize an enormous difference between the position of Athanasius and that of Bishop Gore. Athanasius was practically an Apollinarian. I have been much criticized for making this assertion. Bishop Gore has pronounced *ex cathedra* that I am wrong. He is prepared apparently to declare that Athanasius, even in his earlier years, believed that Christ had a human soul. But he produces no passage in support of this contention.

The Apollinarianism of Athanasius.

Here are a few of the passages which seem to me to prove that Athanasius was practically an Apollinarian:

(1) 'Accordingly, when inspired writers on this matter speak of him as eating and being born; understand that the body,

as body, was born, and sustained with food corresponding t its nature, while God, the Word Himself, who was united wit the body, while ordering all things, also by the works He did i the body showed Himself to be not man, but God the Word But these things are said of Him, because the actual bod which ate, was born, and suffered, belonged to none other bu to the Lord: and because, having become man, it was prope for these things to be predicated of Him as man,[4] to show Hi to have a body in truth, and not in seeming' (*De Incarnation* xviii, 1).

The body only is mentioned, and that repeatedly. Th incarnate Jesus had a body in truth: not a word about a soul Does not that imply that to Athanasius Jesus was not reall man at all, but seemed to be man because the Word spok and thought in a human body? This involved a neare approach to Docetism than we find in Apollinarius himself who admitted a sensitive but not a rational soul. It seem pretty clearly implied that the mind which inhabited that huma body did not really feel pain at all. It is a little more possibl to bring the idea of a sensitive soul within Athanasius' lan guage, because a sensitive soul might, in a sense, be regarde as belonging to the body, but the distinction is nowhere mad by Athanasius.

(2) 'Did He not then hunger? Yes; He hungered agree ably to the properties of the Body. But He did not perish o hunger, because of the Word that wore it' (*De Incarn.* xxi, 7

In the *Orations* against the Arians the same tendency i obvious, if it is less prominent. I cannot find in them any pas sage which shows that Athanasius thought there was in Chris any *consciousness* except the consciousness of the divine Wor —still less any rational consciousness. Canon Lacey ha appealed to what he says about Christ's ignorance as a proo to the contrary: but Athanasius does not attribute this igno ance to the soul, but to the flesh. In reply to those wh insisted upon the fact of the Lord asking questions in proof o the limitation of His knowledge, he says: 'If He knew wha He was doing, therefore not in ignorance but with knowledg did He ask . . . And thus with ease is their clever point e

[4] I have used Bishop Robertson's translation. I should myself be di posed to translate '*a* man.'

ploded; but if they still persist on account of His asking, then they must be told that in the Godhead indeed ignorance is not, but to the flesh ignorance is proper, as has been said' (*Or. contra Arian.* III, 37).

(3) It is the same with the ignorance about the day and the hour. 'He knows Himself what through Him has been determined' (*Ib.* 44).

'But for them, when they thus blaspheme the Spirit, they must expect no remission ever of such irreligion, as the Lord has said; but let us, who love Christ and bear Christ within us, know that the Word, not as ignorant, considered as Word, has said, "I know not," for He knows, but as showing His manhood, in that to be ignorant is proper to man, and that He had put on flesh that was ignorant, being in which, He said according to the flesh, "I know not"' (*Ib.* 45).

'For as, on becoming man, He hungers and thirsts and suffers[5] with men, so with men, as man He knows not; though divinely, being in the Father Word and Wisdom, He knows, and there is nothing which He knows not' (*Ib.* 46).

'For us, therefore, He said, "No, not the Son knoweth"; and neither was He untrue in thus saying (for He said humanly, as man, "I know not"), nor did He suffer the disciples to force Him to speak, for by saying, "I know not," He stopped their enquiries' (*Ib.* 48).

It is pretty clear[6] to me that what Athanasius really thought was that the Mind of Jesus, *i.e.* God the Word, knew, all the time He was speaking, when the day of Judgement would be; but since ignorance is a property of the flesh and He had assumed that flesh, it was right that He should pretend to be ignorant. He was acting a part; He had taken upon Him the *rôle* of man: and therefore He said, 'I know not,' when really He knew. It is utterly impossible that Athanasius should have discussed this problem of the limitation of knowledge in the

[5] By 'hunger,' 'thirst,' 'suffering,' he apparently means that His body submitted to physiological processes which in ordinary men are accompanied by sensations of pain.

[6] Of course I do not deny that much ambiguous language is used (*e.g.* in Chapter 46), some of which would *prima facie* be inconsistent with my interpretation, but it is reasonable to interpret ambiguous passages in the light of those which are clearer, unless we are prepared to admit hopeless inconsistencies within the limits of two or three chapters.

Incarnate without betraying his belief that there was a con scious human soul in Christ, if he had held any such notion.

It has been contended that the word 'flesh' merely mean human nature in general. It is true that Athanasius sometime expressly explains that flesh means 'the man' or 'the race o man' (*Or. contra Arian.* III, 30). But sometimes he uses th term 'body,' which can hardly thus be explained away. Thus in the same treatise, he explains St. Luke's statement that ou Lord 'increased in wisdom and stature' by saying that th advance (*Prokope*) belonged wholly to the body: 'Of the bod then is the advance; for it advancing, in it advanced the mani festation of the Godhead to those who saw it' (III, 52). I may be suggested that he is here speaking of the advance i stature, but the argument requires that it should apply to bot stature and wisdom. In the sentence before he has said tha 'ages belong to body.' Therefore there was never in Chris a mind that was young.

Clearly there is here present to the mind of Athanasiu only two alternatives: the advance must belong to the Logo or to the body: it cannot belong to the Logos: therefore must belong, wholly and exclusively, to the body. So in th later letters to Serapion (II, 9):

'For since He has become man as it is written, and to h ignorant belongs to men, as also to hunger and to thirst and th rest (for men do not know unless they hear and learn), there fore also as having become man He exhibits also the ignoranc of men: He does so first, in order that He may show that H truly has a human body; and secondly, that also, having th ignorance of man in the body, having ransomed and cleanse it from all pollution, He may present the manhood comple and holy to the Father.'

Here, then, is the same assumption that in Jesus Chri there were two elements, and two only, *viz.* the Logos whic was divine, and a body which was human; and even the bod ceased eventually to be human, since by the indwelling of th Word, it was actually by degrees converted into the divi substance. 'The manhood [*lit.* not that which was human] a vanced in Wisdom, transcending by degrees human nature, an being deified, and becoming and appearing to all as the orga

of Wisdom for the operation and the shining forth of the Godhead."[7]

It is true that at a later date—at the Council of Alexandria over which he presided in 362—when the question of Christ's human soul for the first time became explicitly a subject of controversy, Athanasius made an attempt to reconcile the disputants, and concedes formally the fact of the human soul merely on the ground that, if there was no human soul in Christ, the whole man would not be redeemed.[8] But after all it is doubtful whether this concession seriously altered his way of looking at the whole matter. The letter is written in the name of the Council, other Bishops being mentioned by name as well as Athanasius. It may be that he recognized the soul as present in the body, and no doubt as deified with the body, in much the same metaphysical (*i.e.* illusory) sense as that in which he had earlier thought of ignorance as being present 'in the flesh' at the very moment when the Word was merely pretending He knew not the day nor the hour. There is no trace, now any more than earlier, of any *consciousness* which was not purely and entirely divine. Had he really faced all that was implied in the admission, much of his earlier work must have needed re-writing. In any case, his language at this date cannot cancel the clearly contrary doctrine of the earlier writings, nor can they throw any light upon the 'mind of the Nicaean Council.' So far as Athanasius represents the mind of the Council, it is the earlier Athanasius who does so, not the Athanasius who, as an old man, subscribed the decision of the Alexandrian Council in 362. And with that mind Bishop Gore would on this point be wholly out of sympathy; and here I agree with him: for on this subject the mind of the Council (if Athanasius represents it) was Apollinarian, and was corrected by later Councils. But has this difference between the

[7] Or. c. Arian. III, 53.

[8] 'They confessed also that the Saviour had not a body without a soul nor without sense or intelligence (Nous)' (*Tomus ad Antiochenos*). Much later than that (*Ep. ad Epictetum,* circa 371) Athanasius still says: 'Truly our salvation is not merely apparent, nor does it extend to the body only; but to the whole man; body and soul alike have truly obtained salvation in the Word Himself.' In the context he has been establishing the real humanity of the body, but there is nothing about the soul.—Cf. also *Ep. ad Adelphium* (probably belonging to the 3rd Exile). I assume that the treatise against the Apollinarians is not genuine.

position of Athanasius and Bishop Gore's any bearing on the question of the 'personal identity' of Jesus with the pre-existent Word? I think most certainly it has.[9]

Bishop Gore's view of the 'personal identity' of the Logos with Jesus.

To Athanasius there would have been no great difficulty in thinking of the historical Jesus as personally identical with the Son of God, had he thought in terms of our modern 'personality' at all, just because Christ was to him for practical purposes simply God in a human body and nothing else. Now Bishop Gore cannot—at least formally—adopt this position because to do so would be to write himself down an Apollinarian pure and simple. Unlike Athanasius, Bishop Gore has got to say that for him God with a human Soul (after the Incarnation) was personally identical with the Son of God without a human soul (before the Incarnation). And this is obviously a very difficult position. What, after all, in the language of modern philosophy or common usage, is the difference between a human soul and a human personality? They mean precisely the same thing. Ego, soul, spirit, personality—these terms are both in popular language and in philosophical books commonly used to mean the same thing. And yet Bishop Gore contends that the Logos, who was a Person before the Incarnation, was

[9] Harnack recognizes that Athanasius, 'like Arius to the time of the Apollinarian controversy, usually thought of humanity as flesh.' And adds a note: 'So correctly Baur. I have not found Dorner's statement that the presupposition of a human soul occupies the background of the whole view of Athanasius "of the incarnation and redemption as affecting the totality of man" to be supported by evidence.' He thinks, however, that Baur 'goes too far when he expresses the opinion that Athanasius *designedly* left the human soul of Christ out of account' (*History of Dogma*, E.T., Vol. IV, p 37). I should quite recognize that Athanasius had never seriously thought the question out or realised its importance. Loofs duly notes the fact that prior to the Alexandrian Council no recognition of a human soul in Christ is to be found in the earlier works of Athanasius. Even Prof. Ottley recognizes that Athanasius 'regards the Lord rather as the Logos veiled in human flesh than as the man passing through the different stages of human probation and development' (*Doctrine of the Incarnation*, II, p. 33).

united to such a human soul and ever remained the same Person (in the modern sense), and that then and now this Hypostasis or Person remained the same, and therefore purely Divine and not human at all. Now, if I were to have prefixed to this discussion an enquiry about the modern concept of Personality, I should have tried to show that personal identity has degrees. I am the same being as I was when I was one year old, but I am also different—changed, and changed very considerably. In those abnormal dislocations of the personality of which we have heard so much of late, the element of identity may be reduced to a vanishing point. And therefore I will not venture to assert that *a priori* the notion that the Word could be united to a human soul without any loss of personal identity is quite impossible. But if Bishop Gore's words, 'still the same person,' are to be made intelligible, it would have to be accompanied by an equally strong, or a stronger, assertion that the identity was accompanied by difference. And this assertion would involve a frank abandonment of the doctrine so incessantly insisted upon by Athanasius (though not asserted by the Nicene Creed), that after the Incarnation the Word was 'unchanged.' Even on Athanasius' premisses this conception implies a very arbitrary and wholly unphilosophical distinction between what something is 'in itself' and in its relations to other things. Any view of the Incarnation must acknowledge that it involved a change in the relations of God to humanity, and that is really change in God. But on Bishop Gore's anti-Apollinarian view of the Incarnation, the assertion that the Incarnation involved no change is absolutely impossible. There is surely a difference between a Logos united with a human soul and a Logos not so united. If there is a difference, there must be change. The attempt to avoid this consequence—to make out that the personality of the Logos was just the same after as it was before the Incarnation, and therefore purely divine—leads up to the line of thought which was to culminate in the doctrine asserted at Chalcedon—but not contained in the actual Canons of the Council, or reproduced in our Articles—that the Logos took upon Him 'human nature,' but not a human personality, that He was man without being *a* man. I pass over the difficulty that 'hypostasis,' if it be interpreted to mean 'person' in our sense, must also retain its original meaning of

'substance' (most modern philosophers who make much o human personality would not object to calling the soul a sub stance), and that therefore if the 'person' of the Son is t remain purely divine, the substantiality, *i.e.* the reality, of th human soul in Christ, is absolutely denied: or we have t admit two hypostases in Christ, which would be Nestorianisn pure and simple. All these difficulties spring from identifyin the term 'hypostasis' with the modern term 'person.' Jesu Christ was, or 'had,' a human soul, and not a human per sonality! I shall return to the possibility of this doctrine in separate article; but meanwhile I should like to point out tha the divergence from Athanasius involved in Bishop Gore' acceptance—no doubt a very serious acceptance—of the doc trine that the Christ of history had a human soul does not en here. The change which was certainly involved in a divin Being entering into such a union with a human soul as is implie on any view of the Incarnation was, according to Bishop Gore accompanied by a temporary loss of the divine Omnipotenc and the divine Omniscience, which certainly cannot be recon ciled with the idea of absolute sameness or unchangedness.

Limitations of knowledge in Christ.

Bishop Gore's greatest service to the cause of progressiv religious thought in England is his express avowal of that doc trine as to the limitation of Christ's human knowledge whic has happily never been expressly condemned, which was n doubt tacitly assumed by the more traditional theologians in th past, but which had seldom in modern times been expressl avowed by any theologian with a reputation for orthodoxy t lose. The Bishop is fond of differentiating himself fro liberal theologians who hold the same doctrine by saying th he has never denied the 'inerrancy' of Christ as a teache The distinction is a fine one. If Jesus thought that a certa psalm was written by David when it was not written by Davi He did 'teach' what was not true: or if knowing its tru authorship, he yet spoke of it as David's, then we sacrifice H veracity to His 'inerrancy.' No doubt we may say that th matter had nothing really to do with religion, that such a lim tation was not inconsistent with His mission as the Revealer

God, and so He was inerrant as a *religious* teacher: but I should say the same as regards His belief in diabolic 'possession.' I do not see, indeed, how any *a priori* theory could prove 'inerrancy' as distinct from actual freedom from error. All Christian believers will assert that Christ was free from error within certain limits, in certain matters; the question is about the actual limits of His knowledge. And this can only be ascertained by experience. However, this is beside our present point. At all events Bishop Gore admits the limitation of knowledge very frankly.

And this limitation was very extensive. According to Bishop Gore the Word up to the moment of the Incarnation knew everything—all history, all modern science, all the undiscovered science that there is to know, the whole course of future history, so far at least as it is known even to God the Father,[10] but from the moment of the Incarnation He knew all this no more for some thirty-three years. Now, it is surely a difficult doctrine to maintain that such a colossal loss of memory, such a profound change of intellectual outlook, such a complete breach of continuity in the consciousness of the Son, was consistent with what we commonly call personal identity. For a time at least, during His infancy, He knew very little indeed. 'He grew so truly as a human child that Joseph and His mother had not been led to expect from Him conduct incompatible with childhood, when they took Him up with them to the temple in His thirteenth year.'[11] This would apparently reduce His knowledge as an infant to almost no knowledge at all, and even throughout life would deny to Him most of the knowledge possessed by the highly-educated Greeks of His own time, almost all historical knowledge, all knowledge of modern science—still more the enormous mass of at present undiscovered science. Such an admission is hardly consistent with the preservation of personal identity. Certainly it is ridiculous to say that it is consistent with the Word being 'unchanged.'

[10] Bishop Gore pushes his doctrine of indeterminist Free-will to the point of denying even to the Father complete knowledge of the future, with the reservation that the two beliefs are incompatible 'according to any standard of thinking possible to us in our present state' (*Belief in God*, p. 126).

[11] Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 77.

Bishop Gore's Difficulties.

Consider what this really means. There can be no doubt that in the view of Athanasius, if the incarnate Word had ceased to be Omniscient and Omnipotent, He would have ceased to be God. The admission of ignorance in the incarnate Word was the very worst of the Arian offences: ignorance belongs to a created being: the Word was not created and could not be ignorant. An ignorant mind and an all-knowing mind would have been for Athanasius two minds, not one mind.

Lest it should be supposed that I am here attributing to Bishop Gore deductions from his view which he would himself repudiate, I will refer to some passages in his writings which (so far as I am aware) he has never recalled or qualified. He does not, as some advocates of 'Kenotic' theories do, fall back upon the expedient of limiting the ignorance to our Lord's human consciousness, while holding that the divine Word retained His Omniscience: this, he sees, would involve a double consciousness which must end in something like Nestorianism. He deliberately holds that, when and so far as the Incarnate betrayed ignorance during His human life, 'The Son Himself, as He reveals Himself to men in manhood, did not know.'[12] It would seem that either the Universe was for some thirty-three years carried on without the co-operation of God the Word (for to administer the Universe would surely have required a knowledge which Jesus of Nazareth did not possess): or that there was still a consciousness of the Word which somehow retained the Divine knowledge, while the same Word as incarnate in Jesus was ignorant of many things. There can be no doubt which alternative Bishop Gore means to adopt. The words imply, and Bishop Gore has elsewhere told us very distinctly that the Word in His 'Cosmic functions' did not lay aside the divine knowledge which the government of a world implies. 'If we are asked the question: Can the functions of the Son in the Godhead and in the universe have been suspended by the Incarnation? we cannot but answer with the theologians of the Church, from Irenaeus to Dr. Westcott, that it is to us inconceivable. Nor can we dissociate the fulfilmen

[12] *Dissertations*, p. 97.

of these functions from the exercise of omniscience.'[13] The Bishop, for himself, holds 'that the real Kenosis within the sphere of the Incarnation must be held compatible with the exercise of divine functions in another sphere.'[14] This distinction of 'spheres' seems to cover an ambiguity. It seems to admit that, besides the limited and partially ignorant consciousness, there was an omniscient consciousness which was ruling and governing the world and that would practically involve the admission of four distinct consciousnesses, *i.e.* four Persons, in the Holy Trinity at one and the same time. To say that one and the same Person could be at one and the same time Omniscient in one sphere and of extremely limited knowledge in another seems to me to be to use words without meaning. At all events to say that a single personal consciousness could at a given moment in history split up into two such dissimilar consciousnesses 'without change' is a quite amazing assertion.

Fundamental Discrepancy between Athanasius and Bishop Gore.

How Bishop Gore would get out of these difficulties, without committing the 'intellectual offence of obscuring the issue,' I cannot even conjecture. But of one thing I am quite certain—that, on any interpretation of his views, he is poles asunder from the thought of Athanasius and of the Council of Nicaea so far as Athanasius can be supposed to represent the 'mind' of that Council. Whatever exactly he meant by attributing ignorance to the flesh of Jesus, Athanasius would assuredly never have admitted that 'the Word was ignorant.' The suggestion that in one sphere the Word was ignorant while in another sphere He was still the Wisdom that rules the Universe, would have involved for him just such a separation between Father and Son, and such a catastrophic change in Deity, as he wished above all things to avoid. So far as he thought in modern terms of 'personality' at all, he would have protested with all his soul against the notion that the omniscient Son, through whom the Father ruled the world, could have become a child's mind of extremely limited knowledge and that without

[13] *Dissertations*, p. 93.
[14] *Dissertations*, p. 105.

suffering any loss of personal identity or, indeed, any change at all. By 'Godhead' Athanasius primarily meant the possession and the exercise of all the attributes which could be applied to God the Father, especially Omnipotence and Omniscience (goodness is with Athanasius in his metaphysical moments a secondary matter, for this could admittedly be possessed by a created being). The surrender or even the temporary non-exercise of those attributes would have certainly meant to him such a revolution in the very being of the Son as could not possibly be described as involving no loss of personal identity and no 'change.' Certainly, if I am right in supposing that he understands 'person' in the modern sense, Bishop Gore is not orthodox according to the standard set up by the writings of Athanasius. Certainly he does not accept the Nicene Creed if to accept that Creed involves acceptance of the interpretation which Athanasius put upon it.

And incidentally I trust I have done something to show the difficulties of the Bishop's own position. Here perhaps I may be reminded that Bishop Gore sometimes admits that the problem is insoluble by the human intellect. But surely it is unreasonable first to compel us to accept all the consequences which human logic—I feel tempted to say very human logic—draws from the available data, data chiefly supplied by doubtful interpretations of irrelevant passages in the Old Testament, together with assumptions about the inspiration of Scripture and the authority of the Church for which no evidence is offered, and interpretations almost equally strained of doubtful sayings of our Lord; and then, when the reasoning leads to conclusions which to human logic are self-contradictory or absurd, to cry off and protest the limitations of our faculties. Surely it would be a more modest and a more reasonable course to suspect that something must be wrong with the premisses which lead us to such an *impasse*. And here, once more, let it be understood, it is not the Nicene Creed or any other document of the early Church which has landed us in these difficulties, but Bishop Gore's assumption that the Persons of the Holy Trinity are 'persons' in the modern sense, and that the identity between the pre-existent Word and Jesus Christ is what the modern world would call 'personal identity.' The Nicene Creed does not involve such a doctrine.

And now I may be told that to exhibit the difficulties or even the impossibility of Bishop Gore's position does not necessarily constitute a reply to the Bishop's accusation that I do not believe the definition of the Nicene Creed myself, in spite of my own strong assertion that I do. The Bishop declares that he cannot understand what I mean when I protest 'there is nothing [in my view of Christ's Person] which is not compatible with a full acceptance of the Catholic doctrine of the Divinity of Christ as defined by the Creed and the Councils.' I will say something about the other Councils later, and will at present confine myself to the Nicene Creed and Council. And the question will mainly turn upon what we understand by the famous Homo-ousion. If the Word of God is (as Athanasius maintained) the Wisdom of God, I see no difficulty in accepting the statement that the Wisdom of God is 'of one substance' with the Father: the Wisdom of God is certainly as divine and as eternal as God Himself. Further, I believe that this Wisdom of God was revealed in or was united to Jesus Christ in an exceptional, supreme, and unique sense. Athanasius' habitual illustration of what is meant by 'Homo-ousion' is that a son is of the same substance with his father. Most assuredly I believe that there is a certain community of nature between God and Jesus. And I do not think so the less because I also recognize that there is a real community of nature between God and humanity at large. The mind of man is not merely a created thing, but also reproduces in some measure the divine intellect and the divine power or will, and (in some cases at least) the divine goodness, the divine love. There is nothing about this in the Creed; but there is nothing in it which forbids me to hold this, and there is much in the teaching of some of the Greek Fathers—even in Athanasius, much more in Origen—which encourages me to do so. Origen certainly held that the Word of God was united with men in many souls in varying degrees, but that in Jesus this union was far more complete. Athanasius very distinctly recognizes that the Word was 'in the prophets.'[15] The community of nature which receives its most complete development in Jesus consists partly in the reproduction of the divine thought, but most completely in the perfection of His character. I believe (here without the sup-

[15] *Ep. ad Serap.*, I, 31

port of Athanasius but with that of Bishop Gore) that this incarnation of God involved a laying aside of the divine Omnipotence and of much of the divine knowledge, but it carried with it a unique communication of the kind of knowledge which was necessary to enable Jesus to perform the task of completely revealing God to man, and above all the reproduction in Him of the divine character. Such a conception of the relation of Christ to God gives a perfectly real and important meaning to the clauses of the Creed which assert that Christ was 'of one substance with the Father, God from God, very God from very God.' And this interpretation involves no difficulty about the 'cosmic functions' of the Word for those who do not look upon the Word as a consciousness or personality (in the modern sense) distinct from the consciousness or personality of God the Father. No doubt the phrases of the Creed are not those which a modern thinker would most naturally choose. We do not in modern philosophy talk much about a divine Ousia and a human Ousia. We should be more disposed to say, if we had to construct a creed *de novo*, 'Jesus Christ is the supreme Revealer of God: Christ is God revealed in humanity.' But, allowing for the obsoleteness of the terminology, I do not find it at all an unnatural thing to say that the Wisdom of God received the fullest incarnation in Jesus, and that Jesus, so far as He shares and reproduces the divine nature (and that in a unique manner), is of one substance with God the Father, while, so far as He is man, He is of one substance with other men. There is nothing in the Creed which compels me to say that the Wisdom of God was a person (in the modern sense) separate from the person of the Father before the Incarnation, or that He continued to be the same person after the Incarnation.

There is one point more on which I should like to reply to Bishop Gore's utterly gratuitous and unfounded accusation of heresy. In spite of my distinct acceptance of the Nicene definition, he declares that he knows that I look upon Jesus Christ as a created Being. I do hold that the human body and soul of Christ were created. The Word or Wisdom of God who was united to that soul was not created. Most certainly I do not believe that God at a point of time created His own Wisdom. My answer is exactly the answer which Athanasius

himself would have given, except that in his earlier years, at all events, he would have said nothing about the created soul.

I do not contend that the meaning which I attach to the Nicene Creed is precisely the meaning which Athanasius or any other Father of Nicaea attached to it. I do not believe that any enlightened modern thinker so understands it. I believe I have shown in the course of this article that even Bishop Gore does not attach to it the same meaning as was attached to it by those who drew it up. But I do contend that as regards the relation between the Eternal Word and the Father before the Incarnation, my understanding of it is nearer to that of Athanasius than Bishop Gore's. Athanasius did not believe that the Son before the Incarnation was a distinct consciousness from the Father: Bishop Gore apparently does. Athanasius was still further from Arianism than the modern bishop. As regards the personal identity of Jesus with God the Word, I differ from Athanasius just because I take very seriously all that the Church has taught about the true human soul of Jesus. In this Bishop Gore agrees with me, though I do not think he fully realizes the difficulty of holding both the 'personal identity' of Jesus with the pre-incarnate Word and the doctrine of a human soul in Jesus. I cannot distinguish between a human 'person' in the modern sense and a human soul. I should like to know how the Bishop does so.

And here this article must close. I trust that my readers will remember its necessary incompleteness. Further development of my meaning must wait till I have examined some later phases of Catholic doctrine; and I must postpone till then a reply to some other of Bishop Gore's accusations.

But there is one other profound difference between Bishop Gore's position and that of Athanasius, about which I must say a word. The Nicene Creed in its original form contains a number of Anathemas. And there can be no doubt that, when Athanasius and his contemporaries anathematized an opinion, that implies that they regarded the person who held it as being for ever excluded from the hope of salvation. The anathematized heretic would certainly go to hell. Bishop Gore—if I may judge from the general tone of his writings—in spite of the severity with which he is apt to treat formal heresy, does not

believe that everyone who holds any of the opinions condemned by the Nicene anathemas cannot be saved. And this difference implies a quite enormous difference between Athanasius' conception of God and that which commends itself to most modern Christians, a difference infinitely vaster and more important than that which separates the Athanasian from the Arian or the Sabellian, or that which separates Bishop Gore's conception of God from any of those which were professed by any of the 'Modernists' at the Cambridge Conference. And therefore it is to me a matter of astonishment that men like Bishop Gore should take so very seriously the definitions of these Fathers and Councils, and treat with such horror these technical heresies about the doctrine of the Trinity. It is a far worse heresy to think that God will treat Arius as Athanasius supposed that He would treat him than to confound the Persons or to divide the Substance.

How can a General Council which erred so seriously about a matter of such profound importance claim such enormous authority when it pronounces upon matters far more difficult and of far less importance? It may be said, of course, that we in the Church of England are not called upon to subscribe this opinion of the Nicene Fathers, but that we do profess to accept their formula about the Holy Trinity. I quite recognize the distinction: but I contend that we are not bound by their opinions except so far as they are embodied in the Creeds, and that even the phrases of the Creeds we are not bound to interpret in precisely the sense which they gave to them. At all events I hope I have shown that Bishop Gore is very far from doing that himself; and I claim that, if Bishop Gore is at liberty to depart so widely from their original meaning, so are others.[16]

[16] Dr. Rashdall's 'Plain Words to Bishop Gore—I. Obscuring the Issue,' appeared in the December—January (double) issue of *The Modern Churchman*. The series will be continued in subsequent issues.—Ed., *M.C.*

SOME MODERN PROBLEMS OF THE MISSION FIELD

3. Modern Theology in the Mission Field.

By the Rev. E. C. Dewick, M.A., Acting-Principal of St. Paul's College, Calcutta: formerly Principal of St. Aidan's, Birkenhead.
Author of *Primitive Christian Eschatology*.

PROBABLY some of the readers of the above title will be induced to smile, and to refer to 'snakes in Ireland.' Certain it is that the associations of the blessed word 'Missions' are not very suggestive of modern theology. The picture of the average missionary in the mind of the average Churchman remains that of a simple-minded, devout soul, of much zeal—not always according unto knowledge—who is prevented both by temperament and by circumstances from having many dealings with modern theology, unless it be for the purpose of warning his flock against dangerous heretics. Probably a good many Church-people at home have a vague impression that some missionaries are learned, with the queer kind of learning that comes from a knowledge of out-of-the-way peoples and places. Perhaps they may even have heard that a few missionaries have shown ability, almost amounting to statesmanship, in the fields of education or social service. But such cases are recognized as exceptional; nor do learning and ability of this kind necessarily imply any particular interest in modern theology, or any desire to spread the knowledge of it in the foreign mission-field.

This general impression of the mission-field contains a certain amount of truth; and it is easy to note various reasons why the Church in non-Christian lands does not very readily become the home of modern thought on religious matters. At the outset, the type of mind which is likely to be attracted by the missionary 'call' is impulsive rather than intellectual, emotional rather than critical. Such minds, absorbed by the effort to solve urgent moral and political problems, are not so quick to feel the pressure of those more abstract questions, which often force the modern theologian to seek out for himself new lines of thought. So it comes about that a considerable proportion of

those who volunteer for Christian service abroad are not by nature inclined to adopt Modernist views.

This process of 'natural selection' is further accentuated by the traditions and methods of the missionary societies and boards, with whom rests the final acceptance of the majority of candidates for the foreign field. The tests which such bodies apply to the candidates who come before them are very varied; but an open profession, on the part of a candidate, of sympathy with modern theology will rarely facilitate his acceptance, while in certain cases it will involve his summary rejection.

Again, when once the new missionary has arrived at his station abroad, there are many influences at work which help to strengthen whatever conservative tendencies he may have brought out from home. Often, the pressure of heavy work, involving constant itineration along impossible roads in an impossible climate, enervates body and brain so that fresh mental effort becomes out of the question. The little library which the missionary brought out from home with him remains his only storehouse of literature; and for a decade or so, he may have no opportunity to read, or even hear of, any more recent theology. While the world has been moving on, his thought has (in this respect) stood still. Besides this, the effect of living amid the constant hostile pressure of non-Christian surroundings tends to produce an attitude more polemical and defensive than receptive. The missionary feels himself to be an 'Athanasius *contra mundum*'; and the result is—an Athanasius, rather than an Origen. Moreover, he lives in the atmosphere of the native Church; and (in the country districts at least) this is generally conservative, and often reactionary. The people and their pastors lack the mental background which is essential for an intelligent understanding of the *raison d'être* of Modernism; and they fiercely resent any changes of teaching or practice. Only too often, the ecclesiastical controversies brought by missionaries from England to foreign fields are perpetuated with ever-increasing bitterness by native workers. The Catechist who has received 'Evangelical truth' as delivered at Islington passes it on with an added bitterness worthy of the Church Association; the native priest, who has been fed on the pure milk of Anglo-Catholicism through the traditions of Cuddesdon, spices it with a pungency reminiscent of the

Church Times. In such soils as these, modern theology finds it hard to grow.

Yet there is another side to the picture. Not all the influences at work in the mission-field are hostile to modern theology. Conservative the missionary may be; but he is not likely to be much of a conventionalist. In his lonely station, he sheds many of the customs which at home are taken for granted and never questioned. Few indeed are those who are really satisfied with the Prayer Book and Articles as a permanent standard for the young Churches abroad; fewer still are those who in public worship keep always within the prescribed limits of ecclesiastical rules. Experiments, both with and without authority, are being tried, along lines undreamt of at home. In one station that I know, the Easter Day services culminate in a nerve-shattering series of fireworks and explosions; in another, the Daily Offices are sung to Indian chants (without instrumental music) by the worshippers sitting Buddha-wise throughout the service, without any change of posture.

Such incidents may seem but trivial; but they indicate an attempt to express religion in ways that are not merely conventional; and this has an effect on the theological atmosphere. Often I have been surprised, when talking with men who have been isolated for years in remote stations, to hear from them the expression of fresh and original ideas—ideas hammered out, as it were, on the hard rock of lonely experience. In such cases, the thinker is scarcely aware that he is breaking fresh ground; and it often happens that traditional and modern ideas remain jumbled together in his mind with apparent inconsistency. Many a missionary, for instance, who still holds in theory to the plenary inspiration of the Old Testament, is in practice striving his utmost to lead his people upwards from Old Testament standards of morality to something nearer akin to the mind of Christ. Many a priest, who still affirms the infallibility of the Creeds, and their necessity for salvation, is building up his actual teaching with very little reference to Nicene or Chalcedonian Christology. Such men are Modernists without knowing it; not through the researches of scholarship, but in response to the pressing needs of daily life.

But there are other men and women in the foreign field who are acutely conscious of the challenge of new facts which have

confronted them with a fresh urgency since they left home. Some of the problems which belong peculiarly to the mission-field involve the consideration of the most fundamental issues in theology. For instance, the problem of the relation of Christianity to other religions, which was discussed in an earlier article of this series, is intimately related to almost every branch of Christian doctrine. The solution of this problem will react upon our conception of God, of the Person of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, of the Sacraments, of the Church, of Grace, and of the future destinies of mankind.

Now, such a problem as this is far more central in the foreign mission-field than at home; it is one which thoughtful men and women among the missionaries are forced to consider. The materials and the evidence necessary for the formation of a right judgment are far more available for them, living in non-Christian surroundings, than for others; and it ought to be their duty and privilege to make a distinctive contribution to modern theology in this connection.

There are other subjects also, in connection with which the foreign missionary is favourably placed for the purposes of study and the forming of opinions. The much-debated question of miracles—especially miracles of healing—needs careful reconsideration in the light of present-day facts of psycho-therapy. It seems evident that the peoples of the East are far more susceptible than those of the West to the influence of ministries of spiritual healing; and those missionaries who have had the opportunity of first-hand observation of the effects of 'healing missions' in India and elsewhere in the Orient have gained a new view-point, from which many of the conventional pre-suppositions of current Western theology are no longer valid.

Or again, I have found among a number of the more thoughtful missionaries a deep current of questionings with regard to the relation of traditional Christianity to the doctrine of Divine Immanence. In Western theology, that doctrine seems to be virtually ignored; it has little or no place in the religious outlook of the average English Christian. Some of our poets, indeed, seem to have grasped it as a reality; the theologians touch upon it lightly, apologetically, and unconvincingly. In the East, the position is reversed; there the Divine Immanence

(at least in Hinduism) is central, dominant, axiomatic. No doubt there is exaggeration here; but some of those who are in close touch with Hinduism are inclined to ask whether this exaggeration does not supply a needed corrective to our Western methods of thought. Perhaps we have allowed ourselves to be too much dominated by the Transcendentalism of the Old Testament, which has given a tinge of Deism to our current theology, and has blinded us to the reality of the Indwelling Spirit in all life.

I have only touched upon one or two of the points on which, to my knowledge, the minds of many missionaries are much exercised at this time, and on which the mission-field may have a real contribution to make to modern theology. They may suffice to show that theology and foreign missions are not so disconnected as is sometimes supposed.

So far, in considering the mission-field, we have been limiting our attention to the foreign missionary. But, he, after all, is only one figure among many in the Church; and although his figure is still one of considerable importance, its predominance is steadily and rapidly diminishing in many mission-fields, especially those which have been long established as centres of Christian work. In order to understand the position of modern theology in the mission-field, we need to consider not only the theology of the missionaries, but also that of the native Churches as a whole.

In some fields, of course, the Church can hardly be said to have any distinctive theology of its own, apart from that of its missionary-superintendents. This is the case in all the great 'mass-movement' areas, and indeed in all districts where the Church is composed exclusively of the uneducated classes. In such cases, the native pastors and catechists are purely passive recipients of the doctrines imparted to them by the missionaries, or if any modification is made, it is by way of misunderstanding and exaggeration, rather than by way of intelligent development.

But where there is an educated Christian community, the position is different. Young men and women, who have learnt at college to think for themselves, are by no means disposed to accept without questioning the traditional theology. In India

especially, several factors are at this time producing a vigorous theological ferment among the younger generation of Christians.

The leading Theological Colleges of India, both Anglican and non-Anglican, are giving teaching of a distinctly modern type. Their students are men who have already attained to a fair standard of general education, and their knowledge of English enables them to come into touch with the wider thought of the world. They are trained to study the Bible in a historical and scientific spirit, and to face the deeper problems of life with honesty and courage. I do not think that anyone could say that these colleges are the homes of theological obscurantism; on the contrary, they are exercising a powerful influence in spreading the knowledge of modern theology among the rising generation of priests and ministers in the Indian Church; they are breaking down the barriers of denominational exclusiveness, and fostering the desire for a united Church of India on a wide and liberal basis.

Unfortunately, however, these graduate theological colleges only provide a small proportion of the Indian candidates for the ministry. The great majority are found in the small non-graduate colleges, where the teaching is in the vernacular, and generally is given along lines that are strictly denominational and severely conservative. The students of these colleges are for the most part village-boys, who have been chosen by the missionary from the local mission-schools. They go out, after a course of two or three years, to act as pastors of a neighbouring village, knowing only just so much of theology as the missionary-Principal has thought it wise to impart, and debarred by their ignorance of English from any serious independent study. They are often devout and conscientious pastors; but their outlook and teaching is generally such that the more educated members of the Christian community find it difficult to look up to them as teachers with deference, or to 'sit under' them on Sundays with profit or patience. So long as they belong to the older generation, the younger folk are generally prepared to listen to them with respect, if not with agreement but when (as often happens) young clergy, fresh from their non-graduate theological college, vehemently affirm the verbal inspiration of Scripture or the infallibility of the Creeds as essentials of the Faith, then their more liberal contemporaries are no

slow to express their dissent, or (perhaps more often) to absent themselves altogether from public worship. The situation thus brought about is causing serious friction at this time in many mission-fields; and it is not likely to pass away quickly, because the ranks of the 'conservatives' are still being reinforced by young men from the non-graduate colleges. But in the long run, there can be little doubt that the views of the more educated clergy will gain general acceptance.

No estimate of the present position of theology in the mission-field can overlook the influence of the Student Christian Movement. In India, at any rate, I believe that ninety per cent. of the educated Christian young men who take any vital interest in religion are more influenced by the Student Movement than by any other religious organization. It is the Student Movement which arranges the Christian Student Camps in all parts of India; and it is these camps, far more (in my judgment) than the normal activities of the Churches, which give to the majority of Christian Students a sense of vocation and a call to Christian service. Now, the Student Christian Movement is not directly a theological body; but all 'Student Movers' know that in practice its atmosphere is one of free, even adventurous, inquiry, and of determined (some would say headlong) progress. The Indian Christian boys who attend the Student Camps each year are not likely to become pillars of conservatism; in many cases, they are determined to be pioneers of a new type of Indian Christian theology.

Another influence which is tending in a similar direction is the high tide of Nationalism which is sweeping over the peoples of the East. In this, there is danger, as well as promise. Student Christian Camps in India are ringing with indiscriminating denunciation of Western missionaries, Western ritual, Western theology; and the determination of the young Indian Christian to have everything 'swadeshi' (home-made) in the Indian Church may well lead to the rejection of elements that are really valuable and true in the ancient Christian tradition. Still, the new demands are at least challenging the defenders of the old ways to think out the *raison d'être* of their position; and if the present racial bitterness dies away, the truth may be reached by free and courteous discussion. For the time being, the Indian Christian Nationalist is so absorbed with the deter-

mination to vindicate his independence of Western Christianity that it is difficult to secure from him a calm and balanced opinion. First, he must assert his independence—abstain from worship and sacraments—reject the creeds—affirm his sense of spiritual unity with his Hindu brother—simply in order to assert his absolute independence. When that is assured, then he may be prepared to discuss the doctrine and practice of the Indian Church, *de novo*. It is, after all, simply the political situation, reflected in the ecclesiastical sphere.

So far, the Christian Nationalists seem to have very little to offer in the way of a constructive theology. Their Christianity is somewhat vague and diffuse. Turning over the pages of, say, the *Christian Patriot* newspaper, one finds a note of mystical piety, a frequent affirmation of devotion to Jesus Christ, a strong sense of the duty of brotherly love and service towards all fellow-Indians, and an unflinching application of the Old Testament law of 'an eye for an eye' to all offending missionaries—and that is about all. Probably this represents a necessary stage through which Indian Christianity must pass on its way from a docile acceptance of Western theology to an intelligent and constructive modern Christianity.

Meanwhile, it is not always easy for a Westerner to understand sympathetically the working of the Indian Christian mind, which, while violently swayed by racial passions, is in no mood for judicious statements, but is anxious to force an 'entweder-oder': '*Either* you must accept the *whole* of traditional Western Christianity, *or else* you must utterly reject it.' Said an influential young Indian Christian to me recently: 'I can understand the Roman or Orthodox view of the Sacraments; I can understand the Quaker, who affirms his independence of all externals; but I have no use at all for your Protestant missions, with their illogical compromises.' Or here is another typically Indian argument, with a strange mixture of Modernism and Traditionalism: 'I was brought up to believe in Jesus as Divine; I ceased to believe this, because I read in the New Testament that He instituted Baptism and the Eucharist: and I felt sure that a Divine Being would never give detailed rules of that kind, but only great spiritual principles, like those in the Sermon on the Mount. But later on, I learnt that the accounts of the Institution of Baptism and the Eucharist are

probably unhistorical. Then I felt that a great obstacle to my old faith in Jesus was removed; now I can once more worship Him as God.' The speaker was a man recognized throughout India as a leader of the younger generation of Christians, and his thoughts are probably the thoughts of many.

There is one other movement among the younger Indian Christians which may have a considerable influence upon the developments of theology in that part of the mission-field; and this is, the disposition to favour a mystical or ascetic type of Christianity. Partly, no doubt, this is an offshoot of the Nationalist movement, which applauds the 'Christian Sannyati' because he is so completely non-Western in appearance and methods. Partly it is a genuine and natural expression of the Indian genius, and it may prove to be a true 'channel of the Spirit' in the Indian Church. At the present time, a large number of Indian Christian young men are far more attracted to the type of life exemplified by Sadhu Sunder Singh than to the life of the ordinary 'mission-worker' under European control. In various parts of India, Christian 'ashrams' (religious centres) are being started, whose small groups of Christians (Indians and European) live together in a manner far simpler and more Indian than is possible in the ordinary mission-compound, seeking by prayer and meditation to find out the will of God as to the best methods of Christian service in India in the days to come. Men of this type are not exactly Modernists, but neither are they greatly interested in the maintenance of traditional formulas or practices. Readers of Streeter and Appasamy's *The Sadhu* will recall the (to us) strange mingling of childlike simplicity, strong conviction, shrewd commonsense, and wide liberty of judgment which marks Sunder Singh's outlook. Among the best type of young Indian Christians, this is not unusual. To a Westerner, it is surprising to find how often the beginnings of vital Christianity in such cases date from a vision or an intense spiritual experience; and where the religion stands thus rooted, creeds and sacraments and ecclesiastical organization take a secondary place. The theology of the Christian Sannyati (who is likely, if I mistake not, to be a figure of increasing influence in Indian Christianity) will be marked neither by the rigidity of Rome, nor the precision of the Eastern Creeds, nor the polemical note

of Protestant Confessions: but by a simplicity which its critics will describe as inadequate, and by a mysticism which the uninitiated will dismiss as indefinite.

Such are some of the influences at work to-day in the formation or reformation of theology in the mission-field. In isolation, these influences might well result in a one-sided and ill-balanced theology; but in co-operation with that which is best in the traditions of the ancient Churches of West and East, they may lead to the enriching of our knowledge of Christ. It will be for the good of both East and West that an increasing number of English Churchmen of wide sympathies and sound learning should find a place in their studies and in their prayers for the problems which to-day confront the Church in the mission-field.

WHAT DO I MEAN BY GOD?[1]

By the Rev. HUBERT HANDLEY, M.A., author of *Theological Room, The Fatal Opulence of Bishops*, &c.

THE first thing I have to say in telling you what I mean by God, is that I cannot tell you. Words fail here. There are many things which I can tell you with words. I can tell you my name, my age, my height. But there are many things which with words I cannot tell you. I cannot tell you what I mean by the singing of a thrush, by the colours of the dawn, by the deep blue sky at night. I cannot tell you what I mean by the moral law or the look of a little child. I cannot tell you what I mean by myself; this 'me' which has been *there* through all my zig-zag course these sixty years and more, dark and shameful, sublime with some imparted glory, preposterously interesting, insolubly mysterious—I cannot tell you what I mean by 'me.' And I cannot tell you what I mean by God. Throw your money at the stars; it cannot buy them; they are a form of property beyond the reach of the London Joint City and Midland Bank; your coins will fall back to earth jingling and scattered. So words, if they be thrown out at the Divine Being with the purpose of definition, fall back impertinent. I cannot tell you what I mean by God.

[1] The writer, a plain parish clergyman, was lately asked by a learned society to read before them a very short paper in answer to this question. The paper is here printed, by request, exactly as it was read.

But I will tell you the nearest possible equivalent, *viz.* how I know God. As says the ancient wisdom of India: 'From Brahma words come back baffled, as well as the mind, but he who knows him by the joy of him is free from all fears.'

Two things oppressed me. One was Evil—Evil, the ink that stains the pure water of life; that taints even the sweet fountains of childhood; that contaminates the gushing, generous streams of youth and the quiet river of maturity. Inky Evil was for me a black riddle and oppression. The other oppression was Evanescence—the awful impermanence of things. Going, going, gone! Everything going, going, gone! The whole panorama of life, the whole series of panoramas of the whole series of lives—going, going, gone! O, this flux! snatch me from it! take me out of it! carry me away to some house not made with hands eternal in the heavens! That is just what God does; and that is salvation.

Amid the murkiness of Evil and the fugitiveness of the world the Eternal Spirit found me out, looked me in the face, breathed upon me a wonderful confidence and consolation. Spirit to spirit, He and I recognized each other; He and I (I speak with bowed head) understand each other. He will put everything right. Inky Evil is washed out at the touch of His mighty purifications. The shifting scenes around us become irradiated in His Presence with an eternal significance; they become sacramental; they become fit media of grace and joy; they let God's benedictions *through*. Life, for all its difficulties and tears, becomes blessed. *Felix*, says the *De Imitatione, quem veritas docet*.

But somebody objects: Is not all this very individualistic? Is it not Newman's only two luminously real beings? Is it not Plotinus' 'flight of the Alone to the Alone'? It is: that is why, though true, it is wholly insufficient. So far as a man unlearned to his finger-tips can do it, I have suggested God in His transcendence of our world: He must be suggested in His immanence in our world also. I have put transcendence first, because immanence appears to me to be fashionable, to be greedy, to be never happy unless it is swallowing transcendence up. Mr. H. G. Wells, for instance, popular and representative, presses upon us his own theological wares: they consist, in effect, of a God on earth and no God in heaven. My

God, be it said with reverence, starts in heaven and works outwards. But outwards, thanks be to His unspeakable mercy, He does work. For us on earth He shows Himself in nature and particularly in man. And my own individual knowledge of Him is due to my membership in the human family; is due to inherited reverences which I have received from my fathers back through the ages; is due to my share here and now in the profound corporate human awareness of things unseen; is due to the direct teaching of prophets, seers, saints among mankind; is incomparably due to 'that mind which was in Christ Jesus,' to the progressive revelations of the Christian Church, to the genius of Christian worship, to the inspiration of humble Christian companionships. And by a beautiful law it is only as I serve my fellow-men, men my brothers, men the workers—it is only as I love and serve and suffer for them, that there is quickened and developed within me my own sensitiveness to the Majesty on High. Association is the key of human life. Good association is the key of human religion. And man in his long pilgrimage, chanting the still, sad music of humanity—man then catches glimpses of the meaning of his destiny, glimpses of the celestial goal, whenever throughout all times and climes he realizes with his brother men, many or few, the fellowship of the Holy Ghost. *And I heard as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, Alleluia: for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth.*

PORT-ROYAL*

It was a strange destiny which suddenly thrust a small convent of Cistercian nuns, some 20 miles from Paris, into the full glare of publicity, and involved its inmates in one of the most abstruse and embittered of religious controversies. For four centuries the life of the convent had been broken by nothing more startling than the visitation of some appointed dignitary. Two of these visitations stand on record, and make it plain that many irregularities had crept into the conventual discipline. The nuns had got into the habit of accommodating their dress to current fashions. We hear of sleeves 'widening from the elbows,' and other improprieties. The clôture of the convent had become a mere name. The sisters freely left the precincts, and even male guests often occupied the guest-chamber. Each sister regarded her personal possessions as private property. The terms of the foundation provided for twelve pro-

* *Les Lettres Provinciales*, edited by H. F. Stewart, D.D. Longmans, Green and Co. Price 8/6 net.

fessed nuns, and so the number remained at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the convent passed from obscurity into notoriety, and from peace into trouble.

Before this century had half run its course Port-Royal had won for itself an ardent love, and also a relentless detestation. The most powerful persons in France now busied themselves with its fortunes. Courtiers and statesmen, soldiers and lawyers, popular preachers and grand ladies, often sought devout retirement beneath its shadow. But it had made many enemies, and in particular had provoked the hostility of the Jesuits, in which powerful society the French Monarchs now frequently found their confessors. Besides its occasional visitors the convent had now gathered round it a company of more permanent residents to which it would be hard to find a parallel in the annals of Monasticism. This consisted of men who, without taking any vows, lived a life of rigorous asceticism in rooms which adjoined either the original convent (*Port-Royal des Champs*), or the building purchased in 1625 in Paris (*Port-Royal de Paris*). These were the 'solitaries' or 'hermits' of Port-Royal. They occupied themselves with manual labour, with the administration of the convent property, or, if they possessed the necessary qualifications, with literary pursuits or the education of the young. From them the Schools of Port-Royal drew their teachers. From them came the manuals and treatises on education with which the name of the convent is associated. Among them we see the translator of the New Testament, De Saçi, the historian Tillemont, and, for a time, the author of the *Provincial Letters*.

A single half century was enough for this amazing growth. Before another similar period, or one very little longer, had passed, the convent of Port-Royal des Champs had ceased to exist. It was demolished in 1709 by the King's archers as a nest of pestilent heretics, a company of nuns who, in the words of the then Archbishop of Paris, were 'pure as angels, but proud as demons.'[1]

These startling vicissitudes are to be ascribed to two remarkable persons of opposite sex for whom this insignificant convent became the scene of passionate spiritual struggles, and the symbol of truths for which they were ready to sacrifice their liberty and even their lives. These are Jacqueline Marie Angélique Arnauld—in religion the Mère Angélique—and Jean Du Verger de Hauranne, known as Saint-Cyran from the small Abbey of that name, of which he was the titular, although seldom the resident, superior.

The appointment of Angélique Arnauld to be abbess of Port Royal indicates the low state to which the French Church had at this period fallen, and the blunted sense of honour and decency which existed among the best French Catholic families. The new abbess, when she took the vows, had not completed her eighth year, and before the legal formalities incidental to her appointment could be fulfilled, it was necessary that her parents should make her look older than she was, and that the authorities should acquiesce in the concealment. This appears to have caused no hesitation to anyone concerned, and after a noviciate in another convent of the Order, under a superior from whom she can have learned little that was good, Angélique entered upon her duties as Abbess of Port Royal in the eleventh year of her age. Before she was eighteen she had found her vocation, and she never afterwards looked back. A wandering Capuchin, who happened to preach in the convent chapel, fanned the discontent which had long been smouldering in the girl's soul,

[1] *Racine Abrégé*, ed. Gazier, p. 194.

into open flame. But her conversion was the result of no human intervention. It was the first act of that irresistible Grace to which Port Royal in the century that followed was so often called upon to bear witness. Grace shows it power by turning obstacles into stepping-stones. A friar of loose life was a strange instrument to confirm a young girl in the belief that she was taking her responsibilities too lightly. Yet to this sermon she traced her awakening. The work of reformation to which she now devoted herself was marked by two incidents which both testify to the love by which the resolute will of this remarkable woman was informed and directed. The first change made in the discipline of the convent was the restoration of the vow of poverty to its original severity. No inmate of the convent should henceforth call anything she used her own. 'Ours' must in everything be substituted for 'mine.' It does not appear that the young abbess had even to issue an order on the subject. The sisters, seeing her uneasiness, and guessing its cause from her own example, came voluntarily, and surrendered their rights of exclusive property. One poor nun, the oldest of the inmates, had a hard struggle before she relinquished the ownership of a garden whose cultivation was perhaps the only pleasure she had left. But in the end she yielded, and brought the key to the abbess. Still more memorable was the enforcement of a strict seclusion of the convent, which would admit neither of the egress of the nuns, nor of the entrance of strangers. On the day known as 'the day of the wicket' (*journée du guichet*), the abbess had to refuse admittance to her own father, a great benefactor of the convent, who, to his amazement, found the door closed, and was told that the abbess would speak with him at the wicket which opened upon the strangers' reception-room. We can imagine the successful lawyer's indignation at what he deemed a girl's whimsical enthusiasm. A pretty pass things had come to when religion began to interfere thus with family life. He was persuaded at last to talk with his daughter through the wicket. But the interview was too much for Angélique, who, before it ended, fell fainting upon the floor. Here, too, she overcame opposition by the silent strength and grace of her character. Before her death her mother and twelve of her sisters and nieces had become nuns of Port Royal, while one of her brothers and two of her nephews were among its 'solitaries.' When the convent became crowded—the numbers in a few years had risen to a hundred professed nuns—the inmates, weakened by asceticism, were unable to resist the pestilential vapours of the unhealthy valley and the probably ill-drained house. Deaths became alarmingly frequent, and the whole community had to migrate to a building in Paris, bought for the sum of 24,000 livres. This was a serious debt to incur. But the faith of the young abbess did not fail her. 'I had never borrowed,' she said, 'in whatever necessity we might have been, except perhaps some small sum which I returned as I could. Nevertheless, in this strait God gave us grace to to refuse three maidens of position with whom we should have received at least 39,000 livres, because I knew that they wished to make nuns of these girls only that they might obtain richer matches for their two sisters.'[2] A possible lender appeared, but thought it well to inquire first about the security. 'I told him,' said the abbess, 'that for security I could offer him only the lands of our abbey, which were small, and the Providence of God, which was great.' He was satisfied and lent the money. Angélique, however, was not afraid to acknowledge a mistake when she had made one. She would often kneel to one of her sisters whom she had thought it needful to reprove,

[2] *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Port Royal*, Vol. I, p. 324.

and implore pardon for any bitterness of speech into which she might have been betrayed. She knew that pride often masqueraded in strange dresses, and might enter the hearts of her sisters in the form of devotion to their order. It was her sense of this temptation which moved her to say: 'As for me, I am of the order of all the saints, and all the saints are of my order.'

Angélique Arnauld remained abbess of Port Royal, with some intermissions, for 59 years (1602-1661). During this long period we find her and her sisters under the guidance of various spiritual directors, among whom was François de Sales, Bishop of Geneva, since canonized. It is not, however, upon him, but upon the Abbé de Saint-Cyran that the student of Port-Royal should fix his attention. This remarkable man, by the independence of his character, the vigour of his intelligence, and the depth of his religious convictions, stamped upon the convent an impress which it never afterwards lost. His 'entrailles' were fittingly buried in the chapel. His directorate was the golden age of Port Royal. When his relations with it began we find him living, first within the precincts of Notre Dame, and afterwards in the Luxemburg quarter, in a lodging near the Paris house of Port Royal. His life within the city is described as that of a hermit. He was, however, a well-known personage in Paris, and, by his power as a spiritual director, had gained a marked influence in the great world of the time. His maxim was '*prévenir les petits et se retirer des grands.*' But the less he courted the great, the more they sought him. This influence he owed, not to his literary gifts, but to his knowledge of human nature, and to his power of direct and penetrating speech. He was a voluminous author, but his style lacks entirely the qualities which pointed his spoken words. Saint-Cyran is one of the commanding, although sombre, figures of French Catholicism. He had only one object in life. He thought that the human soul was sick, and that his mission was to heal it by the use of the sacrament of penance. To this task he devoted himself whole-heartedly, shutting out every other interest and prospect. Various bishoprics were pressed upon him, but he preferred to remain as he was. An independence of character so marked, combined with so wide-spread a public influence, awakened the distrust, perhaps even the jealousy, of Richelieu, who, while he was still Bishop of Luçon, had published some theological opinions which did not commend themselves to Saint-Cyran. The autocratic Cardinal issued an order for the imprisonment of his critic in Vincennes, where Saint-Cyran remained in an unhealthy cell for five years. On the death of Richelieu he recovered his liberty, but his health had been hopelessly undermined, and he died six months afterwards.

We shall be better able to appreciate the greatness of this man—the greatest of the Port-Royalists as he has often been called—if we watch him at his work of spiritual direction. We see him using the instruments which Roman Catholicism put into his hands for the salvation of men's souls, but using them with that liberty which his knowledge of human nature permitted and prescribed. For him humility consisted, not in thinking oneself incapable of great things, but in recognizing that these great things are only possible in and through God.

> 'There is no greater pride,' he said, 'than in exceeding the commands of God, and in doing great things for Him of one's own initiative, and by some precipitate movement, nor is there any greater humility than in doing great things for Him while keeping within the limits He has laid down, and the orders He has given.'

And it was one of his maxims, once a thing had been done, 'to lose it in

God,' lest it should flatter him and so relax his energy. He seems to have distrusted formal religious exercises, and to have encouraged his penitents to rely upon the Divine knowledge of their desires and necessities. 'Stand before God,' he said, 'without thoughts, and without words, He will understand you.' Again: 'We only need to come humbly before God and to think ourselves happy in that He looks down upon us.' No formal self-examination was needed, he thought, to keep serious bygone transgressions in mind. 'The impress they make upon the soul,' he said, 'is not effaced. It belongs to the soul's immortality.' As for smaller offences, he thought they might well be forgotten:

> 'It is well to forget the past . . . I am by no means satisfied with a hope which only goes so far as to hinder despair . . . God who has commanded us not to look behind when we have put our hands to the plough, Himself does what He would have us do; He does not look upon the bygone sins of a soul which seeks His kingdom.'[3]

Again:

> 'To pass one's time in counting and bemoaning our little faults is like a child who has tumbled down, and who, instead of getting up and running on, stops to cry and look at its dirty hands, an amusement which keeps it back much more than the fall itself.'[4]

He encouraged his penitents to have confidence in God even when they had no signs of His presence. To one of them, who asked him for some assurance that she would not lose the gladness she then felt, he said:

> 'I do not like such a request. Souls which belong to God ought to have neither assurance nor prevision; they should act by that faith which has neither clearness nor certainty regarding the continuance of good works: they should look to God and follow Him moment by moment, depending upon such meetings with Him as His Providence may arrange. I should not desire to know what I shall do when I leave this place. We are bound to ask God for our bread, which is His grace, daily, but I should wish to ask for it hourly. The soul which belongs to Christ should have an unexampled and complete flexibility. It should know how to pass from rest to work, and from work to rest, from prayer to action and from action to prayer; loving nothing, clinging to nothing, able to do everything, able also to do nothing when sickness or obedience arrests it, remaining useless in peace and joy. There is a gain to be found in inactivity, and often when we work we are doing nothing in God's sight.'[5]

This severe and masculine Christianity, strict without punctiliousness, submissive without servility, Saint-Cyran owed to S. Augustine, to whose writings he and his friend Jansen or Jansenius devoted five years of searching study. They thus discovered a Christianity to which nothing they saw around them appeared to correspond. They formed the opinion that the Church had forsaken the narrow way, which was difficult, and chosen the broad way because it was easy. The words of the African Father made it incredible that the mixed multitude who formed the visible Church of the time could be saved by the mere fact of their membership, or could earn eternal blessedness by such penitence as the Church then taught and accepted. Sin seemed far too serious a disease to admit of

[3] *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Port Royal*, Vol. III, p. 450; quoted by Sainte-Beuve, Vol. I, p. 351; ed. 1888.

[4] Lancelot, *Vie de Saint-Cyran*, Vol. II, p. 35; quoted by Beard, *Port Royal*, Vol. I, p. 176.

[5] Sainte-Beuve, *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Port Royal*, Vol. I, p. 352.

such an easy remedy. The whole head of humanity was sick and the whole heart faint. Augustine, pointing backwards as he did to a primæval catastrophe in which the soul had lost its primitive innocence, gave what to the two friends was the only possible explanation, and prescribed the only possible remedy. The soul's awakening, and the restoration of a real Christianity, could only be the work of Divine Grace. And inasmuch as Divine Power could not be thought of as attempting a work to which it was unequal, so Grace wherever it intervened must be irresistible. The responsibility was thus lifted off human shoulders, and left with Him who enables the soul both 'to will and to do.' Man could only wait for this irresistible Grace in humility and penitence. It was not in his power to earn salvation.

This theology conflicted sharply with the doctrine and practice of the existing Church. S. Augustine might be venerated as one of the very greatest of the Church's teachers. It is one thing, however, to venerate a man, it is quite another to act upon his opinions. To conceive of the Divine part in the work of salvation as Augustine did was not possible for a large and multiform Church. Predestination may be logically unassailable. But it is practically incredible and consequently ineffective. Dr. Stewart in his learned Introduction shows us how Augustinianism, while theoretically remaining the doctrine of the Western Church, had been practically deprived of its sting. It had been modified so as to bring the emphasis back to the freedom of the will and man's power to choose. The question involved touched the Church's entire procedure. If salvation could be earned, the Church was the only authority which could settle the price to be paid for it. She must look frankly at the actual difficulties of men, ask what their worldly situation permits them to do, and give them such directions as they were able to follow. From this necessity arose casuistry, or the science of cases of conscience.[6] The two opposed views plainly mark the way of salvation, the one as broad and easy, the other as narrow and arduous. Unmodified Augustinianism leaves the elect few. The science of casuistry makes salvation the rule and reprobation the exception.

The strongest opponents of Augustinianism were inevitably those who saw its practical difficulties with greatest clearness. The Society of Jesus had been intended by its Founder to be an organisation for preaching the Gospel in countries outside Christendom. This intention Ignatius soon abandoned and put his Society at the disposal of the Pope to be used by him as he might see fit. Gradually the work of the Society became clearly defined. In the seventeenth century it had become the most effective weapon of the Papacy for combating heresy and keeping the upper classes of society in at least a formal allegiance to the Church's authority. These objects the Society pursued by its excellent schools, and by the direction of consciences in the Confessional.

We cannot wonder that men so engaged should have deeply resented any attempt to make Augustinianism a living belief. Such attempts might well seem to them not only profitless, but dangerous. They gave rise to interminable controversies, narrowed the Church's limits, and made demands upon ordinary men with which they could not, or in any case would not, comply. For many years before the time we have reached, the question of Predestination or irresistible Grace had been argued by the learned with temper and passion. At length in 1607 Paul V suddenly closed the discussion by allowing the two groups of disputants to hold each its own opinions, but directing them both to hold their tongues.

[6] 'A Casuist is one who studies and resolves cases of conscience, *i.e.* questions of conduct and duty, concerning which the conscience is in doubt.' Stewart, p. xxvi.

For a time there was at least outward peace. The fires, however, continued to smoulder, and burst again into open flame when the *Augustinus* of Jansen, the fruit of the joint studies of Jansen and Saint-Cyran, appeared in 1640, two years after the death of Jansen, but while Saint-Cyran still lived. This laborious folio is little more than a catena of passages from St. Augustine which bear upon the question of Predestination and Free Will. Every avenue of the intricate subject is explored. Every Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian evasion by which some little vestige of nobleness might be left to human nature, and become a claim upon the Divine Mercy, is exposed and repudiated. In the end we see an omnipotent Being and a race entirely dependent upon His undeserved favours. The human will cannot take the slightest step towards the salvation it needs. God must prompt and uphold its faintest motions. If the elect are left few in number, as the spectacle of the world showed them to be, this fewness can cast no shadow upon the Divine Justice. The race could claim nothing at God's hands. If the question were asked: 'Did not Christ die for all men?' the answer could only be found in the actual results of the Atoning Death in as far as these results were discernible by human eyes.

This is plainly a quite uncompromising theology. It had been stamped, however, by Saint Cyran in all its severity upon the convent of Port-Royal. The nuns within the convent and the solitaries outside found in it their strength and their consolation. In obedience to it they renounced the ordinary joys of life, which in many cases they might have had in abundance, and waited upon God in prayer and penitence. They did not think it possible that any one could save himself. If he were to be saved at all, God must save him by an inward pressure which he could not resist. They thought the Sacraments were misused when they were regarded as remedies for sin. Penitence was the condition of their efficacy. And penitence in Port-Royal was no mere superficial regret.

It is not therefore surprising that the nuns and friends of the convent were soon drawn within the storm which broke over the book of Jansenius. The complicated proceedings by which the theology of the book, represented by five startling propositions, was submitted to two successive Popes, and formally condemned, first without mention of any author, and subsequently as to be found within the *Augustinus* of Jansen, need not be here related in detail. It must be enough to say that the sisters of Port-Royal were eventually required to sign a formula in which they not only condemned the five propositions, but condemned them as the doctrine of Jansenius. They professed themselves ready to comply with the first of these requirements. Compliance with the second was, they urged, an impossibility, inasmuch as they could not find the propositions in a book, which perhaps they could not even read. It was this persistent refusal which led to their expulsion from the convent, and in 1709 to its complete demolition.

The moving story of the persecution of these nuns has been saved from the oblivion which might perhaps have overtaken it by the genius of Pascal. It was the *Provincial Letters* which brought the controversies upon Grace within the notice of ordinary men. This was the express object of the Letters. The desire of Arnauld and his friends was that the public of Paris might be made to understand what these controversies really meant. A writer was needed who would constrain the public to read. Arnauld himself was not equal to the task, and invited Pascal, who was then young, to try. The result was these 18 Letters, in which a Parisian endeavours to inform a supposed friend in the provinces upon

the nature of the recent disputes in the Sorbonne. He begins at once in the style which he preserves throughout :—

> We were greatly mistaken. I only learned the truth yesterday. Till then I had thought that the subject of the disputes in the Sorbonne was of great importance and of extreme moment for religion. So many meetings of a company so celebrated as the Faculty of Paris, and the extraordinary and unexampled things which happened at them, give us so high an idea of these gatherings, that we can only believe the reason for them to have been very extraordinary.

The suggestion is thus given at the outset that the whole controversy was much ado about nothing, a mere dispute about words. This, however, was not so. The question really was whether Augustine and his master, S. Paul, had taken the view of human life which Jansenius in his book ascribed to them, and if so whether the accepted theology at all did justice to their opinions. The existing Church stood arraigned by the book of Jansenius on the charge of apostasy. If the conclusions of the book were accepted, both the doctrine and the practice of the Church could not escape condemnation. She had substituted for the Gospel's narrow way of salvation, one which was broad and easy. She had come to explain away her Master's declaration : *few there be that find it.* She greatly exaggerated the strength of the human will. She was even practically denying the necessity of a Divine Incarnation. For if, as S. Paul said, righteousness had been attainable without Christ, Christ need never have lived or died.

This and nothing less was the question at issue. The two first letters, and also the seventeenth and eighteenth, suggest that the disputes were logomachies or, at the most, wranglings as to whether five intricate propositions were or were not to be found in the book of Jansenius. The truth is that Pascal when he began to write the *Provincials* did not know what was at stake. His sister was already a nun of Port-Royal. But its ways and beliefs were still new to him. A few months before he had been a man of the world, driving a carriage with four or perhaps six horses through the suburbs of Paris. When he wrote the first *Provincials* he had associated himself with the solitaries of Port-Royal, and was much in their company. But he had never known Saint-Cyran and cannot have fathomed the theology which the convent represented. Five years of deep reflection, in which he prepared himself for writing his *Defence of Christianity,* convinced him that the method of defence adopted in the *Provincials* with the sanction of the convent's recognised defenders, had been wanting alike in candour and boldness. It had been too timid to befit the defenders of the Church. There should have been no quibblings about grace which was *sufficient* and yet somehow did not suffice, about Divine help which was near and yet somehow not to be had when it was most wanted. It was disingenuous to claim the Thomists as allies when they were really antagonists. The friends of Port-Royal should have boldly affirmed that it was not the book of Jansenius which was being challenged but the doctrines of Augustine and the Apostle of the Gentiles. The words of Pascal himself put this beyond doubt :—

> 'It should be known that the method of defence chosen against the decisions of the Pope and the Bishops who condemned the doctrine and the meaning of Jansenius was so subtle, that although it may have been sound at bottom, it was yet so wanting in openness and boldness that it was unworthy of real defenders of the Church.'[7]

[7] MS. in the Mazarin Library, quoted by Sainte-Beuve, Vol. III, p. 82.

And the *Provinciais* must have been in his mind when he wrote the great words in the *Pensées* :—

> 'The imposition of silence is the worst of all forms of persecution. The Saints never kept silent. . . . After Rome has spoken, and we think she has condemned the truth, and that it is the books which say this, that are censured, we must cry the louder the more unjust the censure is, and the more violent the efforts are which are being made to stifle our words, until a Pope comes who will listen to both sides and will consult antiquity and do justice.'
>
> 'If my letters are condemned in Rome, what I condemn in these letters is condemned in Heaven.'
>
> *'Ad tuum, Domine Jesu, tribunal appello.'*

This is the appeal of individual inspiration against the decision of existing authority. Such appeals, whenever we hear them, quicken the pulse and strengthen a wavering faith. Pascal, however, was asking from the authorities what they could not give. The Augustinian theology could not, in its uncompromising severity, be accepted by a world-wide Church. It conflicted with the ordinary man's sense of justice, and made demands upon him which were inconsistent with life in the world. To hold it up in its naked rigour as the Church's belief would have been to reduce the company of the faithful to a small sect. Bossuet perceived this as clearly as did any Jesuit. The teachings of Augustine might be venerated. To make them practically effective would have been to threaten the very existence of Christianity. The same problem is presented to us by the other subject with which Pascal deals in the these famous letters. As soon as we begin to apply the Christian morality to everyday life we are in the domain of casuistry. The ideally best is seldom possible. Often we are constrained to do, not what we would, but what we can. Opportunism has become a term of reproach. But we are all opportunists, and have generally to choose between two or three courses of which all alike are open to objections. Where, as in the Church of Rome, private confession is an obligation, books for the direction of confessors in dealing with cases of conscience are an imperative necessity, and were frequently composed from the thirteenth century onwards. As Dr. Stewart tells us, 'When the fourth Lateran Council (1215) imposed upon all baptised persons the obligation of confession to the parish priest at least once a year, Christian casuistry received its sanction and its charter.' The passages quoted by Pascal from the Jesuit manuals show us the flagrant abuse of a lawful necessity. Even 'probabilism' was rooted in the undoubted fact that if a moral question be decided by an appeal to authority, the authorities on both sides must be taken into account. As for the permanent moral value of the *Provincials* we may accept the verdict of Dr. Stewart :—

> 'Pascal stiffened the moral conscience and armed it against the misuse of casuistry. Probabilism can do no harm to a properly enlightened conscience, to a conscience which wants to do right, and which takes for its guidance among all the various voices of human opinion the highest law of God. But among the *honnêtes gens* whom Pascal had frequented, and whom the Jesuits confessed, there were many who sought in *Probabilism,* not the solution of their honest doubts, but the excuse for continuing in sin. And there is no reason to suppose that the race of such is extinct to-day.'

Port-Royal thus stands before us as the representative of a cause, defeated indeed in the form which it then assumed, but still living and potent. It still remains true that human salvation depends upon the

action of Divine forces with which we may co-operate, but which we do not create, and cannot control. 'The Spirit bloweth where it listeth.' Paul may plant and Apollos water, but they cannot control the harvest. The fate of the seed sown is determined by the character of the soil.

We would heartily commend Dr. Stewart's book both to the student and the general reader. The Introduction contains a brief but lucid survey of the two great subjects with which the Letters deal, while the Notes answer most of the questions which a student is likely to ask.

JOHN GAMBLE.

BOOK NOTICES

FREMANTLE'S RECOLLECTIONS.*

No true man, having risen to high estate, will kick away the ladder by which he reached his position. We, who enjoy the liberty and light of to-day, do well to remember with affection those by whose efforts the present position has been won. Among such men the Hon. William Henry Fremantle takes a place of his own. His Recollections, fragmentary as they are, take us back to the earlier days of the Broad Church movement, and give us an insight into the forces at work during the last half of the nineteenth century.

The man himself is revealed in the autobiographical passages—patient scholar, liberal thinker, pioneer in parochial organisation, prophet with ideals for Church and State too little understood and appreciated, and at the same time a warm-hearted lover of home and family, and friends and neighbours.

Many interesting personalities appear in these Recollections, such as Jowett of Balliol, Stanley of Westminster, Tait, then Bishop of London.

The account of the pioneer work at St. Mary's, Bryanston Square, is of great interest as showing how more than fifty years ago Fremantle anticipated the formation of Parochial Church Councils. He published a pamphlet on *Lay Power in Parishes: the most-needed Church Reform,* and joined with Lord Grey and others in forming a Church Reform Society and in introducing a Bill for the establishment of such councils in all parishes. But above all he showed how such a council could unite all ranks and kinds of parishioners in common effort for mutual good. No one was excluded from the vote. No changes in Church or parish were made without the mutual consent of clergy and council. Parishioners felt that they were not being managed but trusted. One committee carried out poor relief in alliance with the C.O.S., and another organised social gatherings to which every parishioner was invited by name, district by district. It is significant that Canon Barnett was for seven years his curate, and that both Toynbee Hall and all that it stood for, and Miss Octavia Hill's work in regard to the housing of the poor, were begun under the shadow of St. Mary's Church.

The twelve and a half years (1882 to 1895) as Theological Tutor and Chaplain at Balliol show Fremantle again as pioneer. He laid himself out to promote true religion among the undergraduates, but found himself greatly hampered by lack of backing on the part of the Master and by the opposition of High Churchmen, who feared the tendency of his teaching. He wished 'especially to see the Holy Communion made a living centre of the life of the College.' In his undergraduate days a Terminal Corporate Communion had been held, preceded by 'a short

* *Recollections of Dean Fremantle.* By W. H. DRAPER. (Cassell's; 7/6.)

exhortation to a Christian life' given by each tutor to his pupils in his rooms the night before, which was attended by every member of the College. When he came back in 1882 this had given place to 'an early Communion every week, attended by about 20 out of the 130 undergraduates and by only one tutor.' 'I was anxious (he writes) to restore the Communion to what I believe to have been its real object, that is, to give men a sense of spiritual brotherhood which might pervade the whole life of the community.' But adverse influences were too strong.

Special mention should be made of the books he published: *The Gospel of the Secular Life* (sermons preached at Oxford), *The World as the Subject of Redemption* (Bampton Lecture, 1883), the William Noble Lectures at Harvard in 1900, and *Natural Christianity* (Harper Bros, 1911). In all these the same many-sided ideal of the Church is set forth. 'For him neither the State nor the Church was secular; both were sacred. For him the Coronation of the English Sovereign was as deeply religious as the consecration of the English Primate. Both Church and State were agencies of the kingdom of God, but with different functions. The ideal Church is redeemed humanity, this ideal does not make the Church less sacred, but it turns the home, the factory, the shop, the police court into a church. In so far as a man is a Christian all things become sacred to him.'[1]

The twenty years that he spent at Ripon were full of fruitful service. Mr. Major's appreciation at the end of the volume should be read in its entirety, as it gives a very just and penetrating sketch of the Dean as 'the outstanding religious personality in Ripon, with the exception of Bishop Boyd Carpenter.' He singles out three things which led him to be looked at askance by the traditional type of Church people. His orthodoxy was held to be doubtful, his 'hob-nobbing with Dissenters' was distasteful, and his doctrine of the Church was regarded as Erastian. Perhaps he was not always clear in his efforts to express what he believed, perhaps his doctrine of the Church was more mystic and ideal than most men could take in, but 'wisdom is justified of all her children,' and the impartial Church historian will justify Dean Fremantle as in the truest sense orthodox, as a pioneer in steps towards Reunion, and as a man whose ideal for the Church was high and noble.

JOHN BATTERSBY HARFORD.

ANGLICANISM EXPLAINED.*

This book, containing not only the lectures, but also an important preface of forty-one pages, fulfils a double purpose. The lectures were designed 'with the object of assisting Swedish students to understand the highly perplexing phenomenon which is called Anglicanism'; but they are published also with a further question in view, namely, 'What will be the future of Anglicanism?' Thus from one point of view the book is a historical sketch; from another it is a critical estimate of the existing situation. It is sufficiently obvious that our view of the present position of the Church of England and our interpretation of its history must act and react the one upon the other. Certainly these elements are inseparable in the Bishop of Durham's mind as declared in this volume. But for convenience' sake we may distinguish the two points of view.

[1] See pp. 93-96 and esp. pp. 150-154.

* *Anglicanism. Lectures on the Olaus Petri Foundation delivered in Upsala during Sept.*, 1920. By HERBERT HENSLEY HENSON, Bishop of Durham. (Macmillan & Co., London, 1921. 8/6).

It is difficult for one who, like the present writer, has only spent a very few hours in Sweden, to form any exact picture of the requirements of the theological students of that country. But judging by the difficulty which the ordinary Englishman finds in arriving at any clear idea of religious situations and issues even in Scotland, we can well believe that the Church of England does present, as Dr. Henson tells us, 'an aspect of baffling perplexity to foreigners.' We should expect the Bishop's book to have considerable success in mitigating this perplexity for his friends in Sweden. The seven lectures bring out into clear relief the determinative elements in the history of Anglicanism. The two first lectures cover a good deal of ground and are of necessity somewhat compressed, but the Swedish reader will derive from them a clear idea of the relation of the Reformation in England to corresponding movements on the Continent, and of the mixed characters, admirably sketched here, of Cranmer and of Henry the VIIIth.

In the succeeding lectures the Bishop can treat his subjects more fully. The place of Puritanism in English religion; the phases of our controversy with the Roman See; Episcopacy and its place in the Anglican scheme; the gain and loss of Establishment; the significance of the recent Lambeth Conference—these are the points to which attention is invited, and it goes without saying that the reader, in Sweden or anywhere else, who understands the history and position of the Church of England in these respects, will be largely relieved of the perplexity which at first confronted him. Given the Bishop's own point of view—point of view determines emphasis, and the Bishop of Durham's point of view is to a special degree his own—the presentation of the character of the Church of England as determined by its history appears to us to be admirably made in this volume. The lectures have balance, interest, lucidity, and, as the book is Dr. Henson's, it is hardly necessary to add that they are based on real knowledge and expressed in the dignified English of which he is a master. In view of the hope that there may be closer intercourse between the National Churches of England and Sweden in the future, we suggest that the Bishop might with advantage induce one of his friends in Sweden to provide English readers with a similar account of the history and characteristics of the Swedish Church.

But unquestionably it is as a critical estimate of the existing situation that the Bishop's book will have its main interest for Englsh readers. 'What,' he asks, 'will be the future of Anglicanism?' (p. xiii). The wise do not prophesy and the Bishop does not explicitly answer his own question. But clearly he is not hopeful. Stage by stage the past has led to the present situation, and he finds much in the past to regret. He regrets the loss of Puritanism to the Church through the Act of Uniformity. He regrets the Oxford movement, which 'in the course of less than ninety years has broken up the religious unity of the nation, effected a transformation in English Churchmanship, and brought the National Church to the verge of disruption' (p. 142). The Bishop regrets the Enabling Act. He regrets the retention of Episcopacy as the proposed basis of Reunion by the Lambeth Conference, and he regrets the Anglo-Catholic Movement. If Dr. Henson's fears are realised we may see disestablishment and disendowment, the Church increasingly denominational in character and policy, the English laity more and more aloof from organised religion, the modernists banished into the wilderness, and at last the union of the Anglo-Catholic remnant with Rome on such terms of submission as will alone make this union possible. It will only remain to write, *Fuimus Troes*. Let no one underrate the possibility of such a future for Anglicanism. Still, it has not yet arrived. The Bishop's

attitude is, perhaps characteristically, more critical than constructive. Sometimes, too, he leaves us wondering whether the alternative he clearly would have preferred was really a possibility, given the situation as it was. For instance, it is pretty clear that Lambeth could only have abandoned Episcopacy at the cost of disruption. Those who hope for a different and better future for Anglicanism have to regret the little desire among Nonconformists for reunion, and the indifference of the more liberal English laity to the greatness of their spiritual heritage. But grounds of hope are not wholly wanting, and in any case we have to act in and for the Church of England as it is. Sound learning is still left us. The spirit of laudable service is not extinct. And the traditional sanity of our race is wont to reassert itself even in religion. The *via media* of the future will not be identical with the *via media* of the past, but it may open out to us in due time, and if reconstruction is for the present impossible, at least we can 'carry on.' The vision of such a Church as we believe Dr. Henson would like to see, a Church capable of embracing all that is best and most characteristic in English religious life, a Church able to unite effectively the present with the past, a Church national in many of its qualities and yet spiritual in its outlook—such a vision seems far removed from present facts. Yet the ideal is worth preserving. Regret for opportunities which seem to have been missed may sometimes be overdone. And perhaps the future of the Church of England has rarely been what at any given point acute observers expected it would be.

R. B. Tollinton.

MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY.*

Dr. Foakes-Jackson's new volume practically continues the story so well treated in his *History of the Christian Church to A.D. 461*. His object, however, is to concentrate our attention on the Middle Ages as a single period. Ch. I. appropriately introduces Gregory the Great, as a type of medieval mentality untinged by the humanism and classical education which affected the three other great Latin Fathers. The author presents a critique rather than a chronicle, but his fourteen luminous dissertations are amply enriched with dates, and more detailed narration is scarcely wanted in the case of episodes familiar to most students. Rome's suppression of the great eastern Patriarchates is now a *fait accompli*, and the life of the Greek Church is only occasionally noticed, Dr. Jackson's aim being to present the salient features of this very important period exclusively from the western standpoint. His first five chapters bring us down to the times of Hildebrand—elevated as Gregory VII in A.D. 1073. Their titles must suffice, *viz.* 'The Pillars of the Medieval Church,' 'The Church and the Empire,' 'The so-called Dark Ages,' 'The Church-Empire of the West,' 'The revival and reorganization of the Papacy,' *scil.* after the regime of Popes styled even by Baronius *homines turpissimi . . . usquequaque foedissimi*, cir. A.D. 890-990. With these the author deals very leniently. Hildebrand's tolerance in dealing with Berengarius' Eucharistic views contrasts strikingly with the attitude taken by Rome in the sixteenth century, as also with his own treatment of the clerical marriages prevalent at Milan. The current saying 'Milan for Clerks' might have suggested wiser action. It is piquant to turn aside here and notice the lofty indifference now exhibited to the Papal pretensions by the Patriarch Michael Cerularius (p. 125), and to read how Greek monks

* *An Introduction to the History of Christianity*, A.D. 590-1314, by F. J. Foakes-Jackson, D.D. Macmillan and Co. 20/- net.

unaffectedly deplored 'the horrible infirmities of the West,' instancing along with its interpolation of the *Filioque* clause its prohibition of the marriage of priests. The author does well in showing how little the Canossa incident really affected the issue of Gregory's conflict with the Empire. Henry IV was actually crowned at Rome, and by an anti-pope. Gregory's own ally, Robert Guiscard, wrecked the city, and he himself died a broken-hearted exile.

'The Crusaders' are done ample justice to in Ch. VI. After this Dr. Foakes-Jackson guides us in a markedly impartial spirit over very thorny ground till he reaches, in Ch. X, the real terminus of his story, *viz.* the migration to Avignon, and Clement V's connivance at Philip VI's atrocious extirpation of the Knights Templars. These chapters are headed 'Learning and Heresy,' 'The Medieval Church as a Disciplinary Institution,' 'The Friars; the Schoolmen; the Universities,' 'The Papacy and the House of Hohenstaufen,' 'The French Monarchy and the Papacy.' Rome's 'semper eadem' well describes the short-sighted policy so repeatedly exemplified in Papal history, and the pushful Pontiffs of the thirteenth century really succeeded no better than the modern prisoners of the Vatican—whose pose we are now expecting to see abandoned by Pio XI. Few indeed even of the selected Popes who appear in the useful little memoir at the close of this book can be regarded as even wise in their own interests. Germany may have been defeated in the implacable hundred years' struggle, but the real result was the downfall of Boniface VIII in A.D. 1303, and the disgraceful Seventy Years' Captivity in France. The much lauded Innocent III was gulled even by the despicable John of England, and the net result of his reckless use of spiritual weapons was that they ceased to command respect. No less than 57 sentences of interdict were pronounced by Innocent III. Our author might well have given a more certain sound in presenting this wicked device of victimizing the guiltless subjects of the Pope's personal foes, and we scarcely need the modern Romanist's casuistical pleading on behalf of the Inquisition (pp. 211-215). Its atrocities were countless and inexcusable. To find exculpation in the old Roman legal processes *'accusatio, denuntiatio, inquisitio'* is mere pedantry. We may add that it is quite uncertain whether the wicked principles and absurd beliefs attributed to the Albigenses had any source other than ecclesiastical rancour. The gravamen is penned by their oppressors, and do not Modern Churchmen sometimes protest against having their corn measured in their opponents' bushel? Dr. Foakes Jackson himself admits that the lives of these so-called Manichaeans were 'models of asceticism, self-denial, and decency compared with those of the Catholic clergy.'

In Ch. XII, entitled 'England,' the chief crises in our country's ecclesiastical life are ably and dispassionately presented. We rejoice that not too much space is accorded to the wretched Becket story. Freeman is here misleading, and Dean Hook rightly assesses the real merits of 'St. Thomas,' whose bad cause was reprobated by the best of his suffragans, and whose useless primacy only received lustre by reason of its tragic climax. No myth, however, was more serviceable to fautors of ecclesiastical pretensions. In Ch. XIII there is an excellent 'Survey of Society.' In Ch. XIV—entitled 'Dante and the Decay of Medievalism'—we have a really admirable exposition of the *Divina Commedia,* and are brought to the threshold of the Renaissance. The student will find Dr. Foakes-Jackson's book a mine of useful information. We can scarcely fancy that the admirers of medieval ecclesiasticism will complain of undue expression of partizanship.

ARTHUR C. JENNINGS.

THE CITY OF GOD.*

The delivery of these lectures was one of the last pieces of work carried through by Dr. Figgis. They will be regarded as an important contribution to the literature of the subject.

When Rome was sacked by Alaric the world tottered, and pagans piously attributed the catastrophe to Christianity. To defend his religion Augustine wrote the *City of God*. His object is to show that not the pagan deities, but God, had fostered the growth of the Empire—the *civitas terrena*—though its aims were not His. But simultaneously, under the care of His love, endured and grew the other city, the heavenly, the *civitas dei*. These two commonwealths tread different paths, the one towards the false good of this life, the other towards the true good. Thus, the fall of the former was not the end of all things, if only the latter endured and prospered.

Such is Augustine's theme; vitiated, perhaps, by too ecclesiastical a conception of the ideal commonwealth; yet one which gave to the Middle Ages its philosophy of history, and therefore one to be neglected by no student of the past.

The book, too, has a lesson for our own time, for it emphasises the need for some secure sanction for social and moral idealism. In the view of Dr. Figgis, as in that of St. Augustine, sacrifice 'cannot be justified to the individual apart from an other-worldly aim.' 'Human society and all human culture is possible only by the ultimate recognition of the eternal goal. Otherwise there will come the decadence, such as overcame Greece and Rome and the Renaissance. That is the lesson of the *De Civitate Dei.*'

The *City of God* is one of the great books of the world, and deserves at least as much attention as Rousseau's *Contrat Social,* or Marx's *Das Kapital*. The *Confessions* tell us the story of a much-inquiring and greatly-tempted spirit, and how it found rest in God. The *De Civitate Dei* reveals the ideas and ideals of an ecclesiastical statesman and philosopher—a Christian Ezekiel. J.C.H.

THE PROBLEM OF SEX-EDUCATION.*

This book, prefaced by an appreciative note by the Bishop of Birmingham, endeavours to meet the felt need of a popular explanation of the main elements of comparative biology, with special (but not exclusive) reference to the phenomena of sex.

It is intended to direct the young mind along sound lines of thought in respect of sex in particular and life in general. The first and last chapters are simple, and explain the purpose of the whole book. The biology which it comprises is practically the substance of a medical student's biological course; starting with the simplest forms of life, and working up to mammals and man. It is admirably adapted for this purpose, and will be of great value to those young people of either sex who have a natural inclination towards science.

The question inevitably arises whether comparative biology is the best avenue towards an idealism of life or sex. It is a difficult subject for the child-mind. The main substance of the book would seem beyond the grasp of young boys and girls; the terminology is necessarily hard, and there is a call for high concentration on much detail. This criticism does not condemn the book, but limits its usefulness.

* *Life: how it comes.* A child's book of Elementary Biology. By Stephen Reid Heyman. (Mrs. Lawrence Parsons, M.D., Ch.B.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 5/- net.

The doctrine of evolution has come to be generally accepted as an established principle of race-history: but the knowledge of that history, in general or in detail, has not, in fact, up to the present, proved on the whole an adjuvant to ethics, but rather the reverse. This is because no adequate philosophy of evolution has come to hold the field; science and ethics have not been unified. We need a new philosophy of evolution and a new philosophy of sex: for this we must look to the new Physiology and the new Psychology.

While these difficulties are being straightened out, it seems to the present writer that the growing child's ethics must be based on his own instinctive sense of dignity—on what he is rather than the humble sources from which he has sprung. From the first that sense of dignity embraces the parents: the inherent beauty of the maternal and even the paternal relation, if taught truthfully, early and with some imaginative insight, is of the deepest and most permanent value. Thus it would seem better to start from the self-centre and endeavour to interpret other life to the child in terms of his own developing consciousness, rather than to interpret the child's life to himself in terms of other organisms which represent an earlier stage—or no stage at all—in human development. In other words, the centrifugal method seems better than the centripetal. This is the more so, inasmuch as every child possesses in him or herself a compendium of his own evolution; as his interest widens he will find himself intimately related to all the life around him. This method is on all fours with the natural development of social instincts, starting from the centre, and from thence radiating outwards.

The subject, indeed, of sex-education is full of great perplexity; and perhaps the best methods must be hammered out through trial and error. But one feels that it is primarily a matter of psychological rather than of scientific training.

Nevertheless this book is a serious and successful attempt to instil into the growing mind a sense of the wonderful way in which life and sexual instinct have developed through history, and to inculcate that reverence which alone can turn knowledge to good purpose.

DOUGLAS WHITE, M.D.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE ETHICS OF SUBSCRIPTION.

SIR,

It was a pleasure to read Mr. Anson's article in your February number with its straightforward discussion of a difficult question. Would that we were all equally clear and honest in our views. It is with no lack of sympathy with the article that I venture to suggest a rather different view of the formularies of the Church. I write as a layman who is a radical in theology, but yet feels he can call himself a Churchman, or wishes he were worthy to be so called.

Like the clergy of whom Mr. Anson writes, we laymen use or assent to formularies, such as the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, which include statements which we cannot accept as literally true. I wish to suggest that the way out of our difficulty lies not in the abandonment or re-formulation of these creeds but in taking them for what they are, namely symbols and not simply philosophical or historical statements. It is commonly said that we must interpret certain of their articles in a metaphorical sense. I agree, but submit that this is not enough. It is not a question of particular articles but of the nature of creeds as such. To discuss this question fully is impossible. It raises, for instance, the

whole problem of what we mean by saying that a creed is true and, indeed, what we mean by truth. All I can do is briefly to outline a point of view.

A creed, I suggest, is the expression in theological and therefore symbolic language of the common religious experience of a Church. Its appeal is emotional as well as intellectual. Its recitation implies the desire to share the common experience that gave it birth. A creed is true in so far as it expresses our highest religious experience in the most adequate language. It is the experience as well as the formal expression that matters, and we may accept a creed as embodying valuable truth even if the symbolic language it employs appears to us defective. Hence the truth of a creed does not depend simply upon the congruence of its particular statements with the knowledge of our time, though such a congruence is much to be desired. It depends even more upon the spiritual value of the experience which the creed expresses. Truth, we are told, is an active attitude of mind, and the truth of a creed is in part its dynamic force derived from the intensity and depth of the experience which it embodies. We shall not be able to change our creeds until the Church as a body achieves an intensity of religious experience comparable to that of the early Christian centuries. This is the reason why the suggested substitutes seem so thin. Hence the right course appears to be to take the creeds as on the whole the truest and richest expression of our religious experience available, while openly confessing that we cannot accept them as statements of fact, of the same nature as the statements made in, for instance, a book on science or on history.

I believe it might be shown that the view I have imperfectly outlined is supported by recent work on the psychology of symbolism and by certain currents of philosophical thought. I shall, however, only add two remarks. First, by speaking of experience as the source and test of truth we are not suggesting that truth is merely the product of our own thoughts and feelings. The experience of which we speak is the experience of reality, or reality as experienced. The creeds have value because they bear witness to a reality so supremely real that we can describe it only in symbolic language. Secondly, it is important to be clear as to the sense in which we demand truth of the creeds. The universe of our experience includes many worlds, the world of fact, for example, and the worlds of ethics and religion. In each world truth takes a special form while its essential nature remains the same. These worlds are not entirely separate from each other. The statements in our creeds, for instance, belong in part to the world of history. They ought, therefore, to have the kind of truth appropriate to that world. But it is still more important that the creeds as a whole should have what we may call religious truth. Hence, pending a new Reformation, it is a possible attitude to inquire into their truth from this point of view, and if we believe they have it, to accept that truth even though it is given us in earthen vessels.

The University, Manchester. H. Bompas Smith.

IMPORTANT NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF THE CHURCHMEN'S UNION.

All members of the Churchmen's Union should receive herewith the first number of the Quarterly *Newsletter*.

Their attention is particularly drawn to the election of TEN members of the Council at the Annual Meeting on June 16.

Any TWO members of the Union may nominate one or more candidates, but nominations must reach the Hon. Sec. NOT LATER THAN MAY 1.

P. H. BAGENAL, *Hon. Sec.*
10 Clifford Street, Bond Street, W.1.